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A JURIDICAL ANALYSIS OF RECENT EVOLUTIONARY
DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING NAVAL INTERDICTION OF
SEABORNE COMMERCE AS A VIABLE SANCTIONING DEVICE
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
When President Nixon announced on May 8, 1972 that
he had ordered the entrances to North Vietnam's ports and
harbors mined so as to prevent access by foreign shipping
to Communist docking facilities and to deny North Vietnamese
naval forces their bases of operation, the almost immediate
response by correspondents, columnists and commentators of
various media was to either call the President's action a
"blockade" or to contrast it to President John F. Kennedy's
Cuban Missile Proclamation made almost ten years earlier.
As could be expected, the action which President Nixon
undertook was subject to intense and sometimes vitriolic
public reaction ranging from criticism that such action was
unwarranted, unlawful and excessive to praise that the President's
action was justified, lawful and long overdue. Two lawyer pub-
lists who were among the most vociferous critics of President
Nixon's actions were former Presidential Aide Theodore Sorensen
and former Legal Adviser of the Department of State Abram Chayes.

Both of these men had played an active role in advising
President Kennedy during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Mr.
Sorensen, commenting in an article published in The New York
Times,- analyzed the Soviet's 1962 Cuban threat which he charact-
erized as a rapid, clandestine and closeby offensive missile
buildup by contrasting it to the Soviet's current South East
Asia supply activity which he characterized as beinc an op<
systematic and distant delivery of conventional weapons to their
North Vietnamese ally. From this analysis, Mr. Sorensen cor
eluded that the immediacy and magnitude of the threat which
President Kennedy faced in 1962, amply justified his Cuban
Presidential Proclamation which established a formidable but
selective quarantine- interdict ion whereas President Nixon's far
reaching north Vietnamese mining order could, in no way, 3
considered as being justified since the United States was neither
presently confronted with an equivalent crisis nor remotely faced
with a comparable threat.-* Mr. Sorensen also noted that whereas
President Kennedy's quarantine-intetdiction remained flexible
and was not directed against vessels carrying "food, petroleum,
medicine and the necessities of life, r President Nixon's mari-
time mining measures were directed against all foreign chipping
and therefore lacked the high degree of discretionary, executive
control which the Kennedy Proclamation possessed.
-2-

Writing in The Washington Post two days later, Professor
Abram Chayes questioned the apparent avoidance by President
Nixon of the term "blockade" in the Presidents announcement of
May 8, 1972. * Professor Chayes followed with a discussion of
the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas by
non-belligerents as well as the historical development of the
rules of blockade and contraband. Professor Chayes compared
President Nixon's mining announcement with the action taken by
President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis but observed
that the inherent right of self-defense presently used by the
United States to justify its mining activities had, of necessity,
to be based on the threat of force against U.S. troops in South
5Vietnam since the United States was not a party to the conflict.
Finally, Professor Chayes observed that:
What . . . President Nixon has ordered is not so
different from [the] indiscriminate attack or,
non-belligerent [North Vietnamese bound] shipping.
Perhaps there is a difference from what the German
U-boat commanders did in 1917, but only if the
impersonality of dropping mines is somehow cleaner
than firing torpedoes.
"
It should be pointed out, however, that Professor Chayes
comparison between the United States use of an announced and




in North Vietnam's territorial waters with the unannounced
and unrestricted World War I submarine warfare campaigns
conducted by Germany on the high seas is not a sound analoay.
For unlike the major submarine mining campaigns conducted
during World War I and II wherein advanced notification of
various danger areas was seldom provided, in the case of the
North Vietnamese mining interdiction, adequate notice of the
existence and the general location of all hazardous areas was
provided by the United States at least three days prior to
the activation and arming of all U.S. mines.
It should also be remembered that torpedoes, like bombs
and rockets are aimed and released at their targets and are
therefore classified as offensive weapons while mines, whether
used by a nation for it coastal defense or for offensive
purposes such as a shipping interdiction measure, remain
exclusively passive weapons. That is to say, that the target
vessel cannot be actively sought out by the mine and must
therefore itself come within the proximity of the minefield
in order to be destroyed.
In addition, it has seldom been recognized that mine war-
fare is really more humanitarian than other modes of warfare
since a mining interdiction campaign enables the winner to
materially reduce the resistance of a foe through the reduction
of supplies and war materials without the actual necessity of
_ 4 _
''
killing one's foe. Ships lost in a mine field enter it by
their own choice; and those maritime nations supplying an
enemy are free to keep their vessels and supplies out of
mined waters or attempt to supply belligerent nations by
other alternative means. It is precisely because modern
minefields are so sophisticated, highly effective and not
easily subject to countermeasures , that nations conductina
maritime supply operations with a blockaded target country
normally tend to give offensive minefields a wide berth.
The mark of a successful mining operation , therefore, la not
necessarily the number of ships destroyed or enemy killed,
but rather the absence or significant reduction in shipping
from the mined coastal areas of the target state.
A principle purpose for which a nation seeks to interdict
its enemy's seaborne commerce is to obtain delays in the del-
ivery of the enemy's weapons, munitions and other articles of
war. While not always apparent, it is a fact that every ship
sailing which is delayed, even for one day, represents a loss
of cargo. Thus, it should be made clear that a mining inter-
diction campaign is principally directed against the exclusion
and curtailment of the enemy's supplies and not the killing and
extermination of the enemy's population as an intended foe.
Finally, a mining interdiction limited to the approaches






most instances a less provocative measure than involking the
sanctions of a "traditional" blockade which can require the
searching, seizing, secmestering or even sinking of vessels
on the high seas. Thus, the value of an effective naval
interdiction campaign established through the utilization of
aerial mines, surface vessels or a combination thereof, remains
an extremely important and humanitarian sanctioning device
which is intended to minimize the loss of life and property
while avoiding an uncontrollable confrontation between super-
powers.
Writing in rebuttal to Professor Chaves' caustic commentary,
Professor John Norton Moore has noted that international law
recognizes the right of a belligerent to interdict the flow of
supplies to the enemy by naval blockade and, as is true of the
law of hostilities generally, the applicability of the law of
blockade depends on the factual existence of a state of inter-
national hostilities and does not require a formal declaration
7
of war.
Professor Moore has written that
:
The law of blockade represent [s] a compromise between the
interests of non-belligerents in minimal disruption of
shipping and the interests of belligerents in prevent-
ing war materiel from reaching the enemy. Through the
compromise permits interdiction of commerce with the
enemy, it requires notification as a means of enabling
non-belligerents to avoid the blockade zone and the att-
endant risk of seizure.
6-

Professor Moore has further observed that at a time when
twelve North Vietnamese division? were streaming into the South
and many major South Vietnamese cities were under siege, it
was the magnitude of the threat to South Vietnam and not just
the safety of U.S. forces stationed there that permitted the
United States to jointly act with the South Vietnamese Armed
Forces in exercising the right of collective self-defense.
Professor Moore concludes that the decision to avoid the
term "blockade" was part of a series of careful limitations
intended to minimize the risk of confrontation with all non-
belligerents, particularly the Soviet Union, and to avoid any
implication of a "long distance blockade" or any variety of
other broad claims which have traditionally been associated
with the principles of unrestricted maritime blockade.
The remarks expressed by the foregoing writers would,
therefore, seem to point out that not only are there signifi-
cant differences of opinion as to whether President Nixon's
maritime interdiction measures were necessary and proportional
but also whether the doctrines pertaining to naval or maritime
interdiction were flexible enough to permit such an innovative
mining interdiction procedure to be employed by the United
States regardless of whether the circumstances pertaining to
that particular mode of mine warefare and the realities of
strategic power alignments might have clearly required such a
-7-

modification to be undertaken.
In this regard, Professor Myres £ . McDougal writing
in his book Law and Minimum World Public Order has observed
that:
Much more effective than explicit agreement in the
prescription of the law of war has been the less
easily observed, slow, customary shaping and develop-
ment of general consensus or community expectation.
Decision-makers confronted with difficult problems,
frequently presented to them in terms of principles as
vague and abstract as "the laws of humanity and the
dictates of public conscience" and in terms of concepts
and rules admitting of multiple interpretations, auite
naturally have had recourse both to the experience of
prior dec ision-makers and to community expectation about
required future practice and decision. The myth is that
certain practices are repeated and mutually tolerated
over a period of time by a substantial number of decision
makers in the context of "oughtness" or "authority,"
a certain customary rule or principle of law emerges.
On a more realistic level, the function of this myth is
to permit and authorize decision-makers to achieve a
more rational balancing of past experience, contemporary
realities, and future probabilities without appearing to
create new policy.
In describing such an evolutionary capacity with which con-
ventional and customary prescriptive developments have been
adapted to those rapidly changing technological fields as




The process of customary development, considered as
one continual, creative readaptation or reinterpre-
tation of given prescription, whether conventional
or customary, is particularly marked when it is in
response to patterns of interaction, such as blockade
and submarine and air warfare, which are themselves
be cause of altered conditions and fast developing
technology and technique, in a process of profound and
rapid change. In such cases, the rate of attrition or
obsolescence of particular inherited rules may be
accelerated and the emercrence of new ones hastened . '
In 1958, Captain (later Rear Admiral) Pohert D.
Powers Jr. in an article entitled " Elockade: For Winning
Without Killing," greatly influenced U.S. naval thinking
by stressing the urgent need for a re-evaluation of t:
customary rules of International lav/ pertaining to measures
short of war such as pacific blockade and quarantine- inter-
diction. In his article, Admiral Powers wrote that:
The accepted rules of blockade are now in a state of
evolution. The rules stated in most text books and
even in the naval publications of nations, including
the U.S. Navy's "Lav; of Naval Warfare," are those
developed primarily in the nineteenth century and
thus antedate the era of fast and powerful ships,
submarines, airplanes, and guided missiles. These
rules do not fit the conditions resulting from the
increasing importance of economic factors in war and
the mobilization of all resources of a nation for the
war effort , nor do they provide for the extended use
of blockade as a means of preventing war through de-
prival of trade. ^2
„9_

In forecasting some of the interdiction procedures which
might be used in the future, Rear .Admiral Povers wrote:
The method by which blockade will be enforced can
be expected to change. Submarines and minefields
will be employed. . . . Furthermore, they [sub-
marines and surface ships] can dispatch swift
surface ships or swifter aircraft to intercept the
would-be blockade runner.
Aircraft operating from a supercarrier can be used
to maintain a blockade over a large area. Control
of surface ships approaching a blockaded area could
be exercised by radio. For example, ships might be
instructed by a plane to change course to converge
with a surface vessel of the blockading power. *3
In describing the possibilities of using a U.K. sanctioned
blockade as a measure of collective security and as a measure
short of war which was comparable to "pacific blockade,"
Admiral Powers wrote
:
. . . [0]ne of the interesting possible uses of
blockade is a measure of collective security under
Article 42 of the [U.N.] Charter. Such a blockade
might have a limited puroose and thus be comparable
to "pacific blockade." Under modern conditions, however,
it might be completely ineffective if it limited only
ingress and egress of ships of the blockaded nation.
?. blockade by the United Nations, though adopted as
measure short of war, would orobably have utilized
measures normally used only in [a] belligerent blockade.^
10-

What Admiral Powers was apparently advocatina was that
those measures which were highly effective but the least
provocative and which were normally associated with a war-
time belligerent blockade should be selectively adapted to
"peacetime" naval interdiction situations which would become
more acceptable to non-belligerent trading nations as measures
short of war thereby eliminating the most provocative of the
belligerent blockade sanctions such as condemnation, sinking f
searching and seizure.
Accordingly, this thesis will evaluate recent evolutionary
trends whereby United States decision makers have endeavored
to selectively modify or adapt the principles historically
associated with the concept of belligerent blockade to maritime
interdiction situations which were intended to present narrower
sanctioning claims or represent acts which were intended as
measures short of war.
In order to provide the necessary background pertaining
to those measures which have "normally" been employed during
belligerent blockade, a brief resume of the traditional twent-
tieth century concepts pertaining to blockade and its related




II. SUMMARY OF TRADITIONAL INTERDICTION MEASUP
A. Blockade
According to Lauterpacht ' s International Lawtreatise,
a blockade is the blockinc by men-of-war of the approaches
to the enemy's coast, or any part of it, for the purpose
of preventing ingress and egress of vessels or aircraft of
15
all nations. Although blockade is a means of warfare
against the enemy, it also concerns neutrals as well because
ingress and egress of neutral vessels are subject to inter-
diction and breaches thereof may be severely punished.
The development of blockade as a twentieth century
institution was not possible until neutrality was in some form
recognized as an institution of the Law of Nations and this did
not fully develop until freedom of neutral commerce was in some
form guaranteed. The origin of the institution of blockade
dates from 1584 and 16 30 when the Dutch Government declared all
17the ports of Flanders in the power of Spain to be blockaded.
However, it was not until the rejection of the so called "paper
blocblockades" of the late nineteenth century that blockade was
required to be a total military committment in order to be bind-
ing and effective. *-°
-12

The right of a belligerent to blockade an enemy's coast
provided it uses "competent force" is provided for under
19
the Law of Nations. However, in order to exercise this
right, a belligerent must satisfy the following recuirernents.
First, the nation intending to establish a blockade must
provide suitable and timely notice of his intentions. 20
This means that the Declaration of a blockade must be communi-
cated to (1) neutral powers, by diplomatic means; and (2) to
21local authorities by the commander of the blockading fleet.
A second requirement is that after proper notification
22has been provided, the blockade must be effectively maintained.
The third requirement for a lawful blocade is that the blocade
to be valid, must be impartially enforced.
The condition of effectiveness of a blockade, as defined
by the Declaration of Paris, is that it must be maintained "by
such force as is sufficient to really prevent access to the
coast." 23 During the early stages of the development of the
concept of blockade, some Continental countries took the view
that this provision was intended to require 'a chain of men-of-
war, anchored on the spot, and so near to one another that the
line cannot be passed without obvious danger to the passing
vessel." ~ Subseauently , however, considerably broader def-
initions were formulated so that an effective blockade was later
-13-
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deemed capable of being established "by a force sufficient
to render egress and ingress danqerous . . . and sufficient
to render capture of vessels attempting to go in or come
25
out most probable. '" Ultimately, however, the requirement
for the establishment of an effective blockade was relaxed
to the point that during the Unites States Civil War, Union
naval forces were considered able to effectively blockade
2500 miles of Confederate coastline with only 4 00 Union
vessels.
Declaration of London
In order to establish formal rules pertaining to the
use of naval blockades, twentieth century sea powers, govern-
ed by strong isolationist sentiment and neutrality oriented
interests convened a conference in London in 1908 which
produced a document which later became known as the "Declar-
ation of London of 1909." The Declaration provided that
(1) a blockade must be limited to the enemy's coasts and
must not bar access to neutral ports, (2) to be legal, the
blockade must be effective, (3) the blockade must be applied
impartially throughout the blockaded area, (4) the blockade
commander would have the discretionary power to permit war-




(5) the blockade had to be declared with sufficient specificity
as to given dates, locations and boundaries.
However, the concepts embodied in the Declaration of
London saw little use during the First World War which would
be fought less than ten years later. Instead of the so called
"close in" traditional type blockade which had historically
been used in Europe and which required blockading men-of-war
to "hover" off the enemy's coasts, the Allies resorted to the
so called "long distance" blockade which was an entirely new
and different form of maritime interdiction. The reason for
this sudden change of strategy was that during World War I,
military decision makers saw the need to employ comprehensive
economic and supply suppressing measures through the use
of ,:war zones" and vast mine areas thereby greatly expanding
the scope of a belligerent's economic warfare and blockade
27
operations. In addition, the rapid development of such
offensive weapons as aircraft and long range submarines
were two of the principle reasons why the continued mainten-
ance of the "close in ,: type blockade was considered to be so
dangerous that its future use was no longer considered to be
feasible. 28 As Professor McDougal has pointed out:
-15-

old style techniques of "close in" blockade] against
the coasts of an enemy great power would not only
be confronted with mines and long range shore
batteries but would also present a choice target
for attack by submarines, aircraft [and now, surface-
to-surface and air-to-surfacel missiles. 29
Thus the traditional sanctions associated with hostile
blockade such as interception, visit, search, capture and
condemnation [in prize] were no longer militarily feasible
and military decision makers soon relied upon a more com-
prehensive global approach than merely instituting local
maritime interdiction measures.
The Long Distance (Economic) Blockade
By utilizing a comprehensive system of "war zones" and
a system of wartime commercial "passports" or "letters of
assurance" called "NAVICERTS," the belligerents during
World War II (and to some extent during the later stages
of World War I) utilized a complex system of strategic goods
controls in an effort to deny the enemy access throughout
the entire world, to the raw materials he needed in order
to sustain his wartime operations. This form of economic
warfare was designed to maximize the adverse impact that
such a denial of strategic goods would have on the ability
of an enemy to maintain both his military establishment
-16-
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band or prohibited goods, which were excluded for both import-
ation and exportation purposes, were vigorously enforced by
both sides. It should also be noted that the "scope" of what
was considered to be "contraband" when used in the context of
the contraband of war during a naval blockade was nenerally
determined by the belligerents themselves as being that which
was unauthorized for import or export purposes.
The contraband was called "Absolute" if it consisted of
prohibited materiel such as weapons, ammunition, or naval
31
stores. Materiel which was more susceptible to peaceful
utilization was called "Conditional" contraband.
Absolute contraband could be seized and condemned by a
belligerent without giving notice of any kind so long as the
goods were apparently destined for the belligerent's adver-
33
sary. However, conditional contraband was subject to seizure
and condemnation normally after more rigorous recruirements of
notice, "a resolution of the ambiguity inhering in their sus-
t
ceptibility to both military and nonmilitary types of use," and
a determination that the goods were actually destined for ui
by the "enemy" had been met. 34
In addition to these primary methods of goods control,
certain other auxiliary control methods were devised and de-
veloped by the Allied Powers to buttress and enforce the




the navicert system. 35 One such scheme included the
issuance of the ,! ship's warrant," a document which was
issued to each vessel whose owner had given satisfactory
assurance to do what the Allies required of him. In general,
the owner agreed to comply with economic warfare, or blockade
and contraband regulations and, in particular, he agreed
that his ships would not sail to or from the areas which
required a Navicert without possessing such a document.
In return, the ship owner was guaranteed that his ships
would have access to insurance, credit, fuel bunkers, stores,
charts and dry dock and repair facilities over which the
Allied Powers exercised authority and control. 36
By the selective manipulation and administration of
3uch shipr ing controls, an awesome array of economic sanctions
could be imposed on a "neutral" shipper if he failed to adhere
to the requirements set forth by the /illies. 37 After the
United States entered the war, these economic sanctions became
overwhelming. This was because not only were the ship warrant
and Navicert schemes important to the Allies for the purposes
of interdicting and controlling seaborne commerce, but these
measures were also considered vital in order to secure mer-
chant ship bottoms for the carriage of Allied cargoes. 38
-18

These comprehensive "total" war economic and regulatory
controls became increasingly sophisticated and more thoroughly
implemented a3 the war progressed. However , it is almost a
certainty now that since the advent and reality of modern
warfare methods including the possibility of both nuclear
and local limited warfare, that such stringent economic
measures are not likely to be either planned or repeated in
the future.
B • Pacific Blockade
Pacific blockade is the attempt by one ration to effectuate
maritime restrictive measures against the seaborne trade
of another. The significant, advantages which the proponents
of "pacific blockade" have espoused is that neutral commerce
traveling to the blockaded nation's ports is not adversely
affected and the interdiction measures sought to be imposed
can be commenced without the necessity of a declaration of
war or the necessity of the existence of the state of such
hostilities being proclaimed. One thing is certain, however
and that is that if the nation against whoa these maritime
measures are directed choses to treat them as being something
other than "pacific," then in all likelihood the commencement
of these measures will provoke either an armed conflict or the
possibility of an all out war itself.
-19-
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The utilization of surface vessels in the development
of the concept of "pacific blockade" was familiar to the publists
39
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
However, the acceptance of this concept of minimal force
level application was far from established in international
law and was particularly objected to by early twentieth century
Unites States Naval sea power proponents who viewed pacific
blockade as being entirely nonamicable in nature. ^
Hyde describes the term pacific blockade as referring
to the cutting off of access to or egress from a foreign port
or coast by a naval force designed to compel the territorial
sovereign involved to yield to the demands made of it, such
as granting redress for the conseouences of wrongful conduct,
and whereby the blockading state does not purport to bring into
being a state of war. Such action is deemed to be pacific
merely in the sense that the blockading state is disposed to
remain at peace, while the state whose territory or maritime
commerce is blockaded does not elect to treat the operation
as producing war or compelling it to make war on its potential
adversary.
A description of the consequences which follow in a
pacific blockade is set forth in the United States Naval
-20-
'
War College International Law Situations 1932 as follows
Some act resembling pacific blockade has teen
generally regarded as one of the methods for
bringing an offending state to terms without
resort to war. Pacific blockade has the support
of long practice and of a large majority of author-
ities, particularly since support given this for
of action in resolutions of the Institut d« Inter-
national in 1887. In gerneral , the establishing
of a pacific blockade is usually approved en the
ground that it may make resort to war less probable,
and thus limit the range of possible use of force.
In its effects as between the state or states
establishing the blockade, the blockade, may close
the blockaded areas to communication so far as it
is effectively maintained and measures lawful for
maintenance of a war blockade may be taken to this
end. As the effects of pacific blockade should, so
far as possible, be confined to the parties concerned,
third parties as well as their vessels and goods
should be interfered with only as necessary for phy-
sical maintenance of the blockade. This is also
evident from the fact that there are no prize courts
to pass upon rights. It may be necessary that the
blockading forces approach, within the specific area of
effective maintenance of the blockade, vessels of third
states for verification of their right to fly the flag.
The blockading force may take such measures as are nec-
essary for closing the port before which it is maintain-
ing an effective blockade. Though it may not take ves-
sels of third states as prize, it may prevent their
entrance; and for such detention the blockading state
assumes no liability, though notice must \e. given the
vessel of the third state at the time of blockade or in
an unquestionable manner. [Finally], [v]essels of third
states must be granted reasonable time to load and depart




Boycott as a modern form of retaliatory action
involving the suspension of business and trade relations
on the part of the nationals of an injured state as taken
A O
against the individual citizens of an offending country.
This private, collective refusal to continue to buy goods
from the offending nation, so long as it does not involve
pressure or persuasion from the government of the aggrieved
citizens, is said to constitute a private remedy which is
therefore outside the purview of international law.
However, if the government of the injured parties
becomes involved in any manner, this involvement may create
state responsibility since it involves a form of governmental
self help. 44
The most famous boycott in modern times was the wide-
spread suspension by Chinese citizens of trade and business
relations with Japan in 1931. The Japanese government pro-
tested this action as a violation of international law, but
China expressed the view that prior illegal acts undertaken
by Japanese authorities constituted a far more serious inter-
national law violation.
The Committee of Nineteen, appointed by the Leacme of
Nations to investigate the findings of a special commission





The final type of traditional interdiction
measure relates to the demands by belligerent nations to
control or to embargo in varying degrees, the flow of stra-
tegic foods and supplies which may enhance the enemy's war
AC
potential. In its earliest form, embargo consisted of
detaining, in port, the vessels of an offending state in
order to coerce the latter into remedying a given wrong.
The best known American example of this type of embargo
was established by Congress under the Act of December, 1807.
During the twentieth century, however, two new forms
of embargo emerged as either a unilateral act by a single
state or as a collective act of a number of states, to prevent
an alleged or potential aggressor from increasing its stock-
A "7
piles of essential war materials and strategic goods.
Utilization of a measure such as embargo means that at
the outbreak of a conflict, including a civil war, neutral
states may prohibit the export of war materials to either or
both belligerents by placing an embargo over all exports over
which the neutral nation exercises authority or control
.
In modern times, the United Nations has recommended by
a vote of 47-0, with 13 abstentions that an embargo on arms,






the shipment of all such goods to those areas under the
control of the Communist Chinese and North Korean Govern-
49
ments.
The most recent example of the utilization of embargo
was the action taken by the United States on January 1, 1964,
when it prohibited all public and private sales of military
equipment to the Republic of South Africa pending an end to
that country's policy of racial segregation- ^0 This step
was taken after the United States Government had earlier
(in 1962) forbidden the sale to the South African Govern-
ment of all arms and military equipment which could be used
by that government to enforce racial segregation either in
South Africa proper or within the confines of Southwest Africa
over which the South African Government exercised political




III. ORIGIN OF MODERN MARITIME INTERDICTION
PROCEDURES: THE CUBAN MISSILE QUARANTINE
A » Summary of the Circumstances Leading to the
1962 Presidential Proclamation Establishing
The Cuban Quarantine- Interdiction
On October 22, 1962 , President Kennedy announced that
there had been a rapid and clandestine arms build-up by the
Soviets which had transformed Cuba into an important strate-
gic base capable of launching long-range and clearly offensive
missiles which were weapons of sudden and mass destruction.
The President went on to state that such an action constituted
an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas
and was in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the RIO Pact of
1947, the traditions of this nation and hemisphere t the joint
resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United
Nations and his own public learnings to the Soviets of Sep-
tember 4th and 13th. 53
The President noted that nuclear weapons were so destruc-
tive and ballistic missiles were so swift that any increased
possibility of their offensive use would be regarded as a
clear threat to peace which would not be tolerated by the








dent went on to say that in order to prevent the use of missiles
against this or any other country and in order to secure their
withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere, he had
54directed that certain "initial" steps be immediately taken.
The first step taken by the President wa3 to order a "strict
quarantine" of all offensive military equipment under ship-
ment to Cuba as well as turning back all ships, wherever
55found, carrying cargoes of offensive weapons.
The following day, a quarantine-interdiction was estab-
lished by President Kennedy's Presidential Proclamation of
October 23, 1962. This proclamation entitled "Interdiction
56
of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba," went into
effect at 2:00 P.M. Greenwich time on October 24, 1962. The
operative part of the President's proclamation read as fellows:
Any vessel or craft which may be proceeding toward Cuba
may be intercepted and may be directed to identify itself,
its cargo, equipment and stores and its norts of call, to
stop, to lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to
proceed as directed. Jvny vessel or craft which fails or
refuses to respond to or comply with directions shall be
subject to being taken into custody. Any vessel or craft
which it is believed is enroute to Cuba and may be carry-
ing prohibited materiel or may itself constitute such
materiel shall, wherever possible, be directed to proceed
to another destination of its own choice and shall be
taken into custody if it fails or refuses to obey such
directions. All vessels or craft taken into custody shall





In carrying out this order, force shall not be
used except in case of failure or refusal to comply
with directions, or with regulations or directives
of the Secretary of Defense issued hereunder, after
reasonable efforts have been made to communicate
them to the vessel or craft, or in case of self-
defense. In any case, force shall be used only to
the extent necessary.
"
B . Application of Selective Naval Quarantine-
Interdiction Sanctions Required to Preclude
Uncontrolled Nuclear Confrontation
The principal credit for the operational success of the
Naval quarantine-interdiction should be allocated to the
United States military forces in their execution of directives
emanating from higher authority. As a result of the issuance
of these surveillance, confrontation and visit and search
directives, vessels of third-party states were trailed, inspect-
ed, approached and boarded during various phases of the cuar-
58
antine-interdiction. Submarines of the Soviet Union m the
mid-Atlantic and south-Atlantic were also located, tracked,
surfaced and photographed. ***
The Soviet tanker Bucharest was intercepted on October,
25, 1962. Her cargo was checked visually by a unit of the
quarantine force and she was allowed to proceed to Cuba. The
-27-
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Harcula , a Lebanese ship under Soviet charter was boarded
enroute to Cuba by units of the United States Navy quar-
antine force on October 26th. No items of prohibited cargo
were discovered and the vessel was cleared to proceed to its
destination. 60
During the period that the blockade was effective
,
(October 24th - November 2nd) , fifty-five merchant ships
were reported to have been allowed to proceed after being
f 1
scrutinized by United States quarantine-interdiction forces.
No vessels were reported to have been forcefully seized or
62forcefully boarded. however, sixteen of eighteen Soviet
cargo ships which were enroute to Cuba, were ordered by the
Soviets not to enter the quarantine zone and to instead return
to the Baltic Sea and Mediterranean areas. ~>3
The details concerning the quarantine-interdiction pro-
cedures which were intended for foreign merchant shipping
interests were broadcast by the Navy at regular intervals.
For example, the pertinent part of Notice to Mariners, No. 47
(6206) was regularly broadcast and provided in part that,
The President of the United States has proclaimed
a quarantine of offensive military equipment under
shipment to Cuba. Reactions may make Windward
Passage, Yucatan Channel and Florida Straits
Dangerous waters. Ships are advised to use Mona
Passage. Ships transiting the Straits of Florida
are advised to navigate the proximity of the Florida
keys. . . . 64
-28-
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On October 25th, the Department of Defense established
submarine procedures for the quarantine area. This entailed
notice that United States Naval vessels would recuire identi-
fication according to the international recognition code or
signal "IDKCA" meaning "rise to the surface." The transmis-
sion of the international code was to be accompanied by the
dropping of from four to five harmless explosive sound
65
signals. The announcement of these signals provided that
"submerged submarines, upon hearing this signal, should sur-
face on an easterly course" and that " signals and procedures
employed were harmless" and are to "guarantee the safety of
submerged submarines at sea in emergencies."
The methods of visit and search of merchant vessels
employed by the United States were consistent with the re-
lated visit and search provisions contained in the Law of
Naval Warfare, 67 HWIP 10-2, which provides in pertinent
part that?
Before summoning a vessel to lie to, a warship
must hoist her own national flag. The summons
should be made by firing a blank charge , by
international flag signal or by other recognized
means. The summoned vessel ... is bound to stop,
lie to, and display her colors. . . . If a summoned
vessel takes flight, she may be pursued and broucrht
to, by forcible measures if necessary. &%
-2S-
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A boarding officer should first examine a ship's
papers in order to determine her character, ports
of departure and destination, nature of cargo and
employment, and other facts deemed essential. The


















Charter party, if chartered
Invoice or manifests of cargo
Bills of lading
h consular declaration certifying the
innocence of the cargo may be included
The evidence furnished by papers against a
vessel may be taken as conclusive. However,
regularity of papers and evidence of innocence
of cargo or destination furnished by them are
not necessarily conclusive, and if any doubt
exists, the personnel of the vessel should be
questioned and a search made, if practicable,
of the ship or cargo." *>9
Within three days after the commencement of the quar-
antine, a series of letters was exchanged between President
Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, whereby it was agreed that
the Soviets would stop building their offensive missile bases
in Cuba and would dismantle their offensive weapons systems
70
and return them to the Soviet Union.
On November 2nd, the President made an interim report to
the American people wherein he stated that aerial photographs
(presumably taken by U.S, A-3, F-8 and U-2 type aircraft)
indicated that the Cuban missile sites were being destroyed. x
-30-
-I
Subsequently, United States Naval forces verified that
various "homeward bound" Soviet vessels were carrying what
appeared to be offensive type missiles or their supporting
72
equipment as deck cargo. These vessels were visually
observed to be carrying forty-two crates which appeared to
73
contain the missiles or their respective components. There-
after, the quarantine was terminated on November 21, 1962 when
the President received assurances from Chairman ?:hrushchev
that the Soviet Ilyushin~18 jet bombers would be withdrawn
within thirty days. 74
31
.
Admiral David Farragut ' s famous order , "Damn the torpedoes
,
Four bells!" which the Admiral made during the Battle of Mobile
Bay referred not to mobile naval torpedoes but to crude sea mines
78
which the Confederate forces had employed during the Civil War.
At least a dozen different types of mines including spar, per-
cussion, hydrogen and horological were used by Confederate naval
forces during the Civil War and were credited with sinking thirty
Union ships compared with a loss of only nine vessels due to
Confederate gunfire.
By the Wars end, naval commanders such as Admiral Farragut
recognized that 'there is a natural fear of hidden dangers,
particularly when so awfully destructive of human life as the




From the Civil War period until the advent of the massive
World War I North Sea Mine Barrage in which 70,000 mines were
laid f sea mines remained simple, unrefined but usually effective
naval weapons. SO These simple , sea mines consisted of a large
charge of explosives encased in a suitable container which was
anchored by a chain so that the mine remained undetected while
submerged some ten to twenty feet beneath the water's surface.
Numerous firing devices called ''triggering horns" protruded
33-

from the surface of the mine. In order for the trigaerina horn
to become activated, a passing ship had to physically strike the
mine or its triggering horns with some part of its hull . Hence
the employment of the term 'contact" mine was used to describe
81
these horn studded primitive weapons. However, it was not
until the Second Vtorld War had been commenced that the naval mine
warfare achieved its truly impressive levels of development and
sophistication
.
B • How Modern Underwater Mines E?ork
The recent May 22 , 1972 issue of TIME Magazine has des-
cribed the workings of naval mines for its readers in such
graphic terms that the following verbatim extract is considered
worthy of repeating
:
Most people envision underwater mines as sort of studded
black balls that Gary Grant dodged in Destination Tokyo.
But the delayed-action mines used to seal off North Viet-
namese ports last week are considerably more complex.
Sown by low-flying Navy planes , some of them were dropped
to the surface by parachute; others, equipped with tail
fins, plunged strait to the water. Then they were program-
ed to settle at various depths in patterns designed to
frustrate enemy minesweepers. Some were probably sent to the
-34

bottom while others were moored by cables. The mines
used last week were not the most sophisticated the
U.S. possesses - - the risk was toe great that one of
them, packed with advanced technology might be recover
and eventually wind up in a Russian ordanance laboratory.
Is minefield is generally seeded with a variety of devices
.
Some explode on contact . Some detonate magnetically when
they pick up the magnetic field of a passing ship. Others
go off when a ship's hull {creates a change] in the water
pressure, A mines relatively simple computer can be pn
grammed to react to combinations of signals. Thus some
mines are equipped with "counters. " They trill allow, say,
nine ships to pass by and then blow up the tenth. Such
mines greatly increase the dangers of mine sweeping, since
the [mine] sweeper may be the fatal tenth vessel. So
mines can sit on the bottom for a time, awaitincr a coded
signal to activate. On signal, they can [even] propel them-
selves through the water to a different position. ....
* • The Magnetic Type Mine
The magnetic mine, first developed by the British, improved
by the Germans and later mass produced by the United States,
represented a significant improvement over the old style "con-
tact" type mine which had been in use since the Civil War.
For with the magnetic mine, it was no longer necessary for a
vessel to actually strike a mine in order to detonate it- All
that was required was that a steel hulled vessel which passed
close enough - - caused a shifting in the lines of force of
the earth's magnetic field - - thereby producing a "signature"
of sufficient strength to activate, by induction, the mine's
sensitive firing mechanism. At the heart of the mine's firing
8 3
mechanism, was a sensitive device known as the "dip needles ."
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In order to nullify the magnetic effects which a ship
produces, an expensive and time consuming process called de-
gaussing has occasionally been used by shipbuilders. The
degaussing process calls for a steel ship to be equipped with
a web of insulated cables girdling its hull so as to carry
electric current which creates a magnetic field equal but
opposite to that of the earth. This process "demagnetizes"
the ship's magnetic field which prevents the ship from
activating the mine's "dip needles" so that they will not
deflect causing the mine to detonate. However , during
periods of mass construction of military and cargo vessels,
the degaussing of each vessel is not considered feasible.
Therefore, nations have principally relied upon fleets of mine
sweepers to detect, remove or neutralize the enemy's [magnetic]
type minefields.
In order to sweep an area of magnetic mines, however,
a mine sweeper must create the same influence to which the
magnetic mine responds. To do this, a mine sweeper must trail
two electrical cables approximately 12 00 feet astern through
which is transmitted a powerfully pulsed electric current.
Thus a strong magnetic field is created which is capable of









The Acoustic Type Mine
Sonic and subsonic sounds produced by a passing ship,
its machinery or its propellers are amplified to energize
the firing circuit of an acoustic type mine. The acoustic
type mine can be planted on the sea floor where it utilizes
a simple hydrophone or "artificial ear" to hear a ship's
engines or propellers. When it does, the firing mechanism's
"diaphragm" is caused to vibrate thereby activating the firing
p c
circuit. Mine sweepers attempt to duplicate the equivalent
noise of a ship's propellers by safely dragging through the
water behind them a mechanism called a "hammer" or a "bumble-
bee." This device creates the necessary signature to which
the mine's firing mechanism will respond thereby causing it
to detonate.
3 The Pressure Type Mine
The pressure mine initially introduced by Hitler during
World War II and further perfected by American and British
scientists, is regarded as the most "unsweepable" of modern
mines particularly when their firing circuits are complicated
by a variety of accessories such as arming delays, ship
counters, intermittent deactivating mechanisms called
"sterilizers" and other anti-sweep devices. °'
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ship sucks a diaphram upward thereby closing the firing switch.
In order to sweep then, a mine sweeper must try to
attempt to duplicate the change of pressure produced by a
passing vessel. Since the sensitivity of the pressure mine's
firing mechanism can be adjusted to respond to a variety of
"hull displacements," it becomes exceedingly difficult for a
minesweeper to duplicate, by towing a "guinea pig" hull
through the water, the exact amount of negative pressure to
which the mine's pre-programmed firing mechanism will become
activated
.
Add to the three basic types of mines (magnetic, acoustic
and pressure) a fourth catagory of mine which combinesone
or more of the above arming and detenatincr capabilities in
the same mine assembly and incorporates additional arming
delay switches, ship counters and other anti-sweep devices - -
and you have a formidable, highly sophisticated, effective
and virtually unsweepable naval weapon.
Accordingly, the effectiveness of a nation's mining
or maritime interdiction campaicm will not only depend upon
the different types and guantities of naval mines that are
at its disposal, but also upon the nature and scope of the
mine warfare activities it seeks to conduct in exerting pressure
upon its intended enemy. In order to understand more fully some
of the different settings in which mine warfare has been employ-
ed, the following material relating to selective mining ca-
paigns conducted during World War II and Korea has been includ-







C» United States Mine Warfare Experience in the
Pacific During World War II and Korea
* * The United States World_ War II Mine
Blocade of Japan
When one reflects on the most decisive of the U.S.
military campaigns conducted against Japan during World War 11/
one usually envisions either those highly publicized air and
naval battles such as the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway,
or the awesome specter of those atomic weapons which were un-
ceremoniously used to annihilate much of the population of
Nagasaki and Hiroshima. However, it was neither the decisive
naval battles in the Pacific nor the spectacular atonic weapons
employed against Japan's industrial cities which completely
assured Japan's World War II defeat. For in the words of
89
naval historian Lieutenant Commander Arnold S. Lott,
"[djefeat, when Japan admitted the fact, was a slow creeping
process which began with [the} blockade of her distant sea lanes
and was completed when virtual destruction of seaborne commerce
90
reduced her to economic, industrial and personal starvation."
The effectiveness of the U.S. Pacific blockade was also
apparent to Japan's industrialists such as Takashi Komatsu of





It was not only the bombing of factories
that defeated us, it vas the blockade
which deprived us of essential"raw ^-j
materials [such as] aluminum and coal.
(Emphasis original).
Japan, like most southeast Asian countries, vas vulnerable
to blockade since most of her shallow coastal waters were
highly mineable while her population was almost entirely
dependent for its manufacturing output upon imported raw mater-
ials. For example, Japan's war effort depended on the import-
ation of 90 per cent of all its oil and 88 per cent of all iron
92in order to maintain its military production output.
The United States mine blockade of Japan's waterborne
commerce first began in October, 1942 when the submarines
Thresher and Gar planted 64 mines in Bankok's coastal approach-
93
es. In early 1943, Tenth Air Force B-24s began planting
mines in the Japanese controlled Rangoon River. (It should be
noted that all of these mining operations were unannounced
and clandestine operations the existence of which remained
a secret until the enemy confirmed his suspicions that his
waters were being mined usually through the damage or destruct-
ion of one or more of his manned cargo vessels)
.
Air Force mining operations also included interdicting
river traffic by using floating mines. In one phase of the
Fourteenth Air Force's operation, traffic on the Yangtze River,
40-

an important Japanese supply line for forces in Central China,
was virtually halted through the use of floating mines. These
"floaters" were designed, to float with the current from Letveen
three to six feet beneath the surface during the entire length
of the river. It the end of the three day armed period, these
floating mines detonated themselves.
In 1944 , both the Royal and the Australian Air Force
began conducting long range mining raids. These 3,000 mile
missions were systematically flown from bases in India and
Ceylon in order that the harbors and waterways of Singapore
could be mined. This increase in minincr activity, principally
through the utilization of magnetic type mines, slowed Japanese
shipping operations to the point that cargo could r.o loncer
move from Bangkok to Singapore in iron ships , but instead had
to be transferred to wooden vessels of 150 tons or less. The
Japanese also attempted towing 500 ton barges from Singanore
to Bangkok but were defeated in this effort when accoustic mines
were used to augment those magnetic minefields already in place.
Fuel for Bangkok was sent to French Indochina and then hauled
overland. However, excessive demands placed on limited rail
and road facilities, soon reduced efficiency by 50 per cent
while merchant crews became increasingly reluctant to venture
onto the inland and coastal rivers as well as to venture upon





By the Spring of 194 5, a parallel situation also prevailed
upriver from Shanghai. No metal -hulled ship dared to sail up-
river because of the presence of magnetic type mines . Thus
river traffic was confined to small wooden vessels. As a result,
the Japanese drive into South China slowed down, with troops and
materiel being sent inland over inadequate rail systems.
During the same time period, the blockade of Japan's mari-
time "outer zone" had nearly been completed and the effects were
being felt in the Japanese home islands. Prior to 1945, the
principal hazard to Japan's maritime commerce was not so much air-
craft mining activities but seaborne attacks and mining operations
conducted by United States submarines. U.S. submarines went where
Japanese vessels could also be found - - placing mines in areas of
maximum shipping density. As a result, United States submarines
claimed one ship casualty for every eight mines laid with only
slight damage or destruction to U.S. submarine forces.
" 6
However, the massive interdiction of all waterborne traffic
headed for Japan's huge eastcoast ports and harbors did not
reach its final degree of intensity until the Air Force launched
its "OPERATION STARVATION" 97 on March 27, 1945. While the
title of OPERATION STARVATION was chosen during a period when
"World public opinion" for the selection of such descriptive
nomenclature was of only minimal significance, the effects of
this total industrial blockade, even though it meant severe
deprivation of fuel, food and clothing for Japan's population was,
42-
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in reality, the very instrumentality which convinced the
Japanese that their cause v;as now hopeless and vhich therefore
mandated a quick and humane surrender.
Eisanobu Terai, the President of NYK, then Japan's largest
shipping line blamed food and raw material shortages for Japan's
defeat and claimed, somewhat inaccurately, that in the last
few months of the war, "proportions of shipping sunk were
1 by sub, 6 by bombs, [and] 12 by mines. While these pro-
portions are not correct, the statement gives some indication
of the relative magnitude of the threat to Japan's waterborne
commerce which Japanese shipping interests attributed to the
U.S. mining blockade.
In remarking on the effectiveness of the U.S. mine blockade,
Captain Kyuzo Tamura, of the Imperial Japanese Navy, claimed
that at least 20,000 men and 349 minesweepers were kept busy
in an attempt to keep Japan's sea lanes and harbors open during
the U.S. blockade. Losses in Japan's minesweeper fleet were
extremely heavy with only one in four of these vessels surviving
Japan's minesweeping operations. ^9 Captain Tamura told post-
war interrogators that "the result of the B-29 mining was so
effective against shipping that it eventually starved the country
I think you probably could have shortened the war by beginning
[the mining] earlier." So intense had become the fifth and
final stage of OPERATION STARVATION (9 July to 15 August) that
66 Japanese ships were sunk during a 36 day period in the
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Shimonoseki Straits alone. i01 Of Japans 's 22 major merchant
shipyards, all but three were rendered useless due to mines. 102
Acute shortages of coal, oil, salt and food nearly wiped out
the remaining operative portions of Japanes industry which had
survived the U.S. bombing raids of the Japanese Islands.
Dispite modest B-29 losses, over 12,135 mines were sown in
Empire waters alone during the four month period in which
OPERATION STARVATION was conducted, * 04 This vast aerial mining
effort represented an expenditure of only 5.7 per cent of the
Twenty-first Bomber Command's resources. The Twenty-first
Bomber Command sank or damaged 606 ships totaling 1,251,256
tons. Against a total loss during OPERATION STARVATION of
of 670 Japanese ships, only 15 U.S. 8-2 9s were lost or destroy-
ed. This meant that for each 45 Japanese ships sunk by mines
laid by B-29 aircraft, only one U.S. B-29 aircraft was
105
sacrificed. By any measurement of effectiveness, the ratio
of the losses of ships and the curtailment of Japanese
imports including weapons and strategic materiel when compared
to the losses of U.S. aircraft, clearly justified the U.S.
mining blockade from an economy of force standpoint alone.
Through competent planning by the Navy and effective
implementation by the Air Force, OPERATION STARVATION, regard-
less of the Draconian title used to describe it, significantly
reduced Japan's capacity to wage its offensive operations.
-44-
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The cumulative effect of the U.S. blockade and mining
operation was to materially reduce the time for the U.S. to
win the war and to eliminate the need for the United States to
conduct massive invasion operations in the Japanese mainland.
Had the above mining operation commenced in January, 1945
as the United States Navy had recommended, the increased
attrition of enemy merchant shipping might have significantly
reduced Japan's resistance by the time the Okinawa assault had
arrived. Almost certainly, the increase in shipping losses
suffered by the Japanese plus the drastic reduction of imports
to Japan, would have brought the Japanese, even before the
first atomic test bomb was exploded at Alamogordo, N.M., to




2 . The United States Mine Warfare Experience
in Korea: The Lesson of the Wonsan Invasion
During the 19 50 Korean War, Russian manufactured sea mines
were supplied to North Korea for defensive coastal emplacement
against U.S. invasion forces at Wonsan, Korea. Russia avoided
a direct confrontation with the United Nations forces and decid-
ed instead to content itself with merely supplying mine warfare
technicians and materiel which meant in effect that Russia was
107
attempting to fight the U.S. invasion fleet at Wonsan by proxy.
Initially, the Soviet mining effort in North Korea was
probably intended to keep the United Nations ships out of
North Korean coastal waters thereby hampering U.N. offensive
capabilities. However, since the bulk of the U.N. 's naval
force was comprised of ships of the Unites States Navy, the
Korean war also provided the Soviet Navy with an ideal oppor-
tunity to test the U.S. Navy's ability, as of 1950, to cope
with Russian mine warfare technology, 10 8 in addition, the
Korean peninsula was almost ideally suited for an experiment
in defensive naval mine warfare since most of its coastal waters
were shallow and muddy thereby offering optimum ine laying and
concealment conditions.
Early in September 1950, U.N. ships and aircraft sighted
mines in the Yellow Sea on 54 separate occasions. Worse yet,
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more than 25 of these nines were of the floating contact
variety and had been sighted on the surface in the high seas
around the Korean Peninsula. 109 These ''drifter" type mines
were assumed to have become detached from their moorings and
had therefore floated to the ocean surface. Whether the ommis-
sion of self- scuttling devices on these Soviet built mines was
intentionally planned for operational purposes or whether the
demands of economy or a crash production schedule resulted in
the elimination of this required self-destruction device could
not be positively ascertained
.
Article 1 of the Hague Convention of 19 07 forbids nations
"[t]o lay anchored submarine mines which do not become harmless
as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings .
"
Since this convention was principally the result of the neutral
trading nations, at that time, attempting to protect their own
commercial maritime interests, it could be argued that the
treaty provision requiring that contact mines once having
broken their moorings must detonate themselves is inapplicable
to a wartime situation where no "neutral" traffic can be found
on the surrounding high seas and the defending coastal nation's
waters are controlled by hostile naval forces. In any case,
since Russia and North Korea were not signatories to Hague
Convention VIII (1907) relative to the laying of automatic





nations were neither bound by the Convention's provisions HI
112
nor the customary practices of international lav.
However, despite the existence of a significant member of
"floating* type mines which had been observed drifting in
North Korean coastal waters, the primary threat to U.N. naval
forces at Wbnsan was not the existence of floatinc contact
mines but massive North Korean laic mine fields in which the
Communists had sown an estimated 3C00 moored contact and
pressure type mines. 113
To counteract the presence of this Communist mine threat,
the exact presence and location of which was merely suspected
but not actually confirmed by the United States amphibious
forces, the U.S. Navy was able to deploy a small force of only
six minesweepers, ^ This diminutive minesweeper force,
which was manned principally by reserve personnel, represented
the remnants of a once sizeable reservoir of of highly trained
talent which had dwindled almost to the vanishing point between
1945 and 1950.
In 1947, the headquarters of the United States Mine Force,
Pacific Fleet was abolished and severe budgetary cuts as well
as the general military de-emphasis of mine warfare had x-educed
the U.S. Navy's world VJar II Pacific minesweeping fleet from
its former level of 525 ships to a mere handful of 22 vessels
for the entire Far East. 115 This extremely small minesweeping




of Wonsan harbor for an entire U.S. amphibious landing force,
was allowed only five days in which to complete an extremely
hazardous operation the extent and complexity of which, at the
time of its inception, was absolutely unknown. (As a result of
the Wonsan operation, the status, composition and readiness of
the U.S. Navy's mine warfare forces were subject to in depth
review and re-evaluation during the post Korean War period)
.
The attempt to clear Wonsan Harbor of mines commenced on
October 10, 1950 and ended fifteen days later when Wonsan
channel had been swept clear. However, the operation took
three times longer than initially planned. During the fifteen
day period that the tiny minesweeper force of six ships was
attempting to clear Wonsan Channel, a jam-packed naval amphib-
ious task force carrying most of the First Marine Division re-
peatedly steamed southward for twelve hours only to double lack
over the same course for over a week in what the ?<*arines sar-
castically called "Operation Yo-Yo" 11€;
The herculean U.S. mine sweeping effort which culminated
in an unopposed landing on October 25th, was completed only
after an expenditure of thousands of manhcurs of planning and
preparation and after the sinking of two U.S. minesweepers
known as the Pirate and the Fledge . *-*
'




ftionsan amphibious landing force which ms unable to carry cut
its objective for a period of ten days, was absolutely stymied
due to the efforts of a relatively small force of North Korean
trainees who were expertly supervised and assisted by Russian
naval and mine warfare personnel. Post-Wonsan assault prison-
er interrogations revealed that over 3000 mines were laid by
the North Koreans using simple wooden barges of the type
118
normally used in river and coastal traffic. These craft
were fitted to carry approximately ten to fifteen mines. In
some instances, North Korean coastal fishing vessels also par-
ticipated in Communist mine laying activities. * The mines
were manually loaded on wooden barges and were then towed to
a pre-determined location where, on signal, they were rolled
off the stern of the barges at intervals of from one to one
and one-half minutes. While these North Korean mining tech-
niques may have appeared primitive by U.S. standards, they
proved to be highly effective judging from the results of the
excellent mine field patterns which were laid in close inter-
120gration with Wonsan's coastal defenses.
Two major lessons were learned from the serious delays
which the Communist mine fields created for the United States
Navy. First, dispite the ability to sink an enemy's fleet and
cope with his submarines while simultaneously conducting offen-
sive air and naval support missions for friendly troops ashore,





supplies cannot be moved and landed ashore \;hen and where
they are needed because the Navy has been denied, due to
the presence of enemy nine fields, the effective control of
the sea and, Second, in order for the U.S. I^avy to remain
prepared to cope with either an offensive or defensive
enemy mine warfare threat, no so-called "subsidiary" branch
of the Naval service, such as occurred durir.o 1945 to 195
to U.S. mine warfare, should ever be neglected or relegated
1 ?3to such a minor role in the future.
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D • Circumstances Leading_ to _ the_Commencement
of Naval Interdiction Operations of North
Vietnamese Harbors
1. Presidential Announcement Describing the
Need to Mine Worth Vietnamese Harbors so
as to Interdict Seaborne Commerce
At the very beginning of his May 8, 1972 radio and tele-
vision address, President Nixon told his listening audience
that in early April, 1972 North Vietnamese Communist forces
had "launched (a massive] invasion that was made possible by
tanks, artillery, and other advanced offensive weapons supplied
to Hanoi by the Soviet Union and other Communist nations."
After reviewing all of the measures which he had previously
directed Dr. Henry A. Kissinger [Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs] and Ambassador William Porter
[Chief United States Negotiator at the Paris peace talks]
to undertake in and effort to achieve a peaceful settlement
,
the President said that the North Vietnamese had flatly refused
to consider any of these new proposals. *** Instead of being
cooperative, the President said the North Vietnamese had met
each of his offers with insolence and insult. The President




In the 2 v.'eeks alone since I offered to resume
negotiations, Hanoi has launched three new military
offensives in South Vietnam. In those 2 weeks the
risk that a Communist government may be imposed on
17 million people of South Vietnam has increased,
and the Communist offensive has now reached the
point that it gravely threatens the lives of 60,000
American troops who are still in Vietnam.
There are only two issues left for us in this war:
First, in the face of a massive invasion do we stand
by, jeopardize the lives of 60,000 Americans, and
leave the South Vietnamese to a long night of terror?
This will not happen. We shall do whatever is reouired
to safeguard American lives and American honor.
Second, in the face of complete intransigence at the
conference table do we join with our enemy to install
a Communist government in South Vietnam? This, too,
will not happen. We will not cross the line from
generosity to treachery." * 24
The President then went on to outline three Hhard
choices" which confronted him: (1) "immediate withdrawal of
all American forces, (2) continued attempts at negotiation,
or (3) decisive military action to end the war." * 25
After reviewing his available options , the President concluded
that*
There is only one way to stop the killing [and]
that is to keep the weapons of war out of the




The President ended this phase of his presentation with
the observation that when the enemy abandons all restraint,
throws his entire army into battle while refusing to negotiate,
we simply face a new situation. Under such circumstances,
with 60,000 American servicemen threatened, any President who
failed to act decisively would have betrayed the trust of his
127
country and betrayed the cause of world peace.
The President went on to state that he had concluded that
Hanoi must be denied the weapons and supplies it needs to con-
tinue its aggression and, therefore, in full coordination with
the Republic of [South] Vietnam, he had ordered the following
measures implemented
:
All entrances to North Vietnamese ports will be mined
to prevemt access to these ports and North Vietnamese
naval operations from these ports.
United States forces have been directed to take approp-
riate measures within the internal and claimed territor-
ial waters of North Vietnam to interdict the delivery
of any supplies.
Rail and all other communications will be cut off to
the maximum extent possible.
Air and naval strikes against military targets in North
Vietnam will continue. *28
President Nixon stressed that the above actions which he
had ordered taken were not directed against "any other nation."
-54-
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Countries with ships presently in tiorth Vietnamese ports
had already been notified that these ships had "three daylight
periods to leave in safety." After that tine, the President
said, the mines will have become active and any ships attempt-
ing to leave or enter the mined ports will do so "at their own
risk.'
Finally, the President set forth two conditions which had
to be met in order for him to order a cessation of the inter-
diction measures which he had ordered. First, all of the
United States prisoners of war had to be returned ; and second
,
there must be an internationally supervised cease-fire through-
out Indochina. Once the prisoners were released and once the
internationally supervised cease fire had begun, the President
said, then all acts of force throughout Indochina tvould le
terminated and at that time, all American forces would be
withdrawn within four months time. 129
*• Justification Advanced by U.H. Ambassador
George I?. JBush_ in an icat ing_ the U.S«
Position to the United Nations
In his letter to the President of the Security Council of
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President of the United states had directed United States
forces in Southeast Asia, in conjunction with forces of the
Republic of Vietnam, to mine the entrances to the ports of North
Vietnam in an effort to prevent the delivery of seaborne
supplies. L3 ^ Ambassador Bush's letter asserted that the massive
invasion across the demilitarized zone and the continuing aggres-
sion by the forces of North Vietnam against the people and ter-
ritory of the Republic of Vietnam had created unprecedented
dangers to the country, its people and the forces of the Republic
of Vietnam and those U.S. forces which still remained in South
Vietnam. As a result of this North Vietnamese aggression, the
Ambassador said that the U.S. had commenced interdiction activit-
ies of all North Vietnam bound seaborne supplies as measures of
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collective self-defense. These collective self-defense
measures were being reported to the United Nations Security
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Council as required by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
The Ambassador's letter noted that since a major portion of
the supplies through which the invasion of South Vietnam was
being supported entered North Vietnam by sea, it was essential
that further delivery of seaborned supplies be completely halted.
After restating the interdiction measures which President Nixon
had ordered as a minimum necessary to meet the North Vietnamese
threat, the Ambassador expressed the belief that these measures







completely reasonable. The letter also noted that in addition
to general notices being given of the measures taken against
North Vietnam, the naval forces of the United States and the
Republic of Vietnam would also notify any vessel approaching
the mined internal and claimed territorial waters of North
Vietnam of the existence of these mined waters.
3 • Amplifying Remarks Made by Presidential
Adviser , Dr . Henry A. Kissinger
During his preliminary remarks made or. May 9, 1972 at
a press conference given at the White House, Presidential
Adviser Henry A. Kissinger outlined the steps which he had
taken in early 1972 on behalf of the United States to achieve
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meaningful negotiations with the North Vietnamese Government
.
Dr. Kissinger indicated that in March of 1972, United States
intelligence sources showed that the North Vietnamese, while
steadfastly refusing to resume negotiations, were rapidly
building up their forces and that by Easter Sunday (1972) , the
United States had become aware of the beginning but not the
size and scope of a new North Vietnamese major offensive. Dr.
Kissinger said that since the United States was then committed
to trying to cultivate its improved relations with Peking and
Moscow, the United States did not wish to take any immediate






However, Dr. Kissinger also noted that during his recent
visit to Moscow in the Spring of 1972, "We pointed out to the
Soviet leaders the extraordinary complexity that %m.m pox
for us by a massive invasion of the entire North Vietnamer
field army against South Vietnam, an invasion that if it
achieved its objective was hound to jeopardize the security
of 60,000 Americans, and the impact that such developments
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had to have on our attempts to move forward on a broad front."
Dr. Kissinger said that the Soviet leaders felt every effort
should be made to resume negotiations; and on this basis the
U.S. proposed a return to plenary sessions provided the U.S.
was given firm assurance that a productive private meeting
would guickly follow.
Unfortunately, no substantive discussions vith the north
Vietnamese were to be immediately forthcoming. VThen a meeting
between the U.S. and the North Vietnamese negotiators was
finally arranged after six months of attempting to set. up such
a meeting, the North Vietnamese simply read a previously pub-
lished statement which, according to Dr. Kissinger, could have
135been clipped from a newspaper and sent to us in the mail."
Dr. Kissinger concluded this phase of his press conference by
saying that
:
No one can believe that 2 weeks before a summit meeting
that it had taken us 2 years to se up, the President





We were confronted with the fact that an opponent was
insisting on continuing an all-out military offensive
which would stop only on terms that no American Pres-
ident can be asked to accept. And this is why, Kith
enormous pain and great reluctance, this administration
was forced into those [interdiction] decisions.
For 2 years we have been engaged in negotiations on a
broad range of issues with the Soviet Union. We are
on the verge not just of success in this or that nego-
tiation but of what could be a new relationship of
benefit to all of mankind - - a new relationship in
which, on both sides, whenever there is a danger of
crisis, there will be enough people who have a commit-
ment to constructive programs so that they could exer-
cise restraining influences. But in order for sue!? a
policy to succeed, it cannot be accepted that one country
can be oblivious to the impact on another of the actions
of its friends, particularly when those friends are armed
with the weapons of this country. 137
* • ^.^^^K^J ^ Deputy Secretary of Defense
Kenneth Rush
In an early morning televised appearance *38 on the day
after President Nixin's May 8th mining- interdiction announce-
ment, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kenneth Rush made the follow-
ing distinction between the interdiction of supplies bound for
North Vietnam and the interception of foreign ships bound for
North Vietnamese ports:
We are not stopping ships. We are saying that we
are preventing the delivery of supplies to North




When asked a question by Pentagon Correspondent Robert
Goralski pertaining to the possibility if a Soviet vessel
going within North Vietnamese territorial waters, the Secretary
responded that while there was no decision to bomb such a ship,
a decision had been made to prevent the offloaded supplies froir.
that ship from ever reaching the shore. When asked how North
Vietnamese bound supplies could be prevented from reaching
shore, Secretary Rush responded as follows:
There are many ways. One of them is, of course, that
the ship itself would be taking a very grave risk if
it came within the 12-mile limit and hit a mine.
Another is, of course, once the ship is unloaded and
if you have lightering (unloading of a ship or a barge
for transport of supplies ashore), we, of course could
subject the lightering ships to bombing. We could [also]
bomb tthem] once they reach shore. We have alternatives
in that regard, but the measures we will take will de-
pend upon the circumstances.
When asked how great a risk the United States had assumed
by taking such an apparent "escalatory move", Secretary Rush
answered
:
That, too depends on one's point of view. We feel
that the way to bring about peace, to bring about a
ceasefire, is to prevent the munitions of war and
the supplies needed for this invasion from reaching
the invaders. We are not stopping ships on the high
seas. We are not even tombing ships anywhere as of
now, and we've made no decision to bomb at all. So
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there need be no escalation whatever as between us and
any other countries and there should be a deescalation
with regard to the North Vietnamese if they dor) 't have
the munitions and the supplies and are ur*ablc to carry
on this massive invasion of the South.
Mr. Goralski thereafter asked Secretary Rush a question
which was perhaps one of the most pertinent inquiry of the
interview and which pertained to the selectivity of the U.S.
mining-interdiction and its effects on freedom of navigation
on the high seas
:
Mr. Goralski: Mr. Secretary, a mine can't discriminate
between a Soviet ship hauling in SAM missiles or tanks
and a Japanese [ship] carrying in foodstuffs. Aren't
you, in effect, saying that you don't want anybody to
trade with North Vietnam now because if they do, if
they bring in their equipment by sea, they risk the
possibility of those ships [hitting a mine and being]
lost?
Secretary Push: Yes, we're saying that we cannot dis-
tinguish between ships carrying munitions or war and
ships that might be carrying just food. Therefore, we
cannot allow any cargoes to reach shore. (Emphasis added)
During the concluding segment of his interview, the
Secretary was asked what was perhaps the most probing cruestion
presented to him during the course of the interview. In
this question, Secretary Rush was asked by Mr. Goralski
if, not withstanding the recent favorable results achieved by
the United States and the Soviet Union on such matters as the
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Four Power Agreement on Berlin and the great progress made
on the SALT negotiations , v/hether it was 'expecting an
awful lot from Moscow" for therr. to "just sit Lack and tell
the North Vietnamese we're not goinc to help you any more?
To this question Secretary Push responded as follows:
A war is a very serious calculated risk in any event.
There was a serious calculated risk when the arms
supplied primarily by the Soviets, massive arms, North
Vietnam moved virtually her entire forces into South
Vietnam in this massive invasion. This involved very
serious risks which the President pointed out. The
North Vietnamese are equipped with the very latest in
missiles, in SAMS, in artillery and tanks, in trucks
and all those things, everything needed for a massive
invasion by a military state of a neighbor. This
involves military risks. There are also, obviously,
risks involved in attempting to prevent this invasion
from going forward sucessfully, by preventing supplies
from reaching the armed forces of that invading country,
anci WG think those risks are acceptable. (Emphasis added)
5 • Explanation of_ United States Activities
Presented by Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird
On the morning following Deputy Secretary of Defense Rush's
television appearance, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird was
asked during a Pentagon press conference what the United
States would do if the Soviet Union attempted to remove any of
the mines which the United. States had laid. To this question
the Secretary responded, 'First, we will take all steps that






As you know, mines are a passive weapon. Mo ore has to get
involved with a mine. That decisior, is rade not by us, but
is made by those people that confront the mines."
When asked to explain the reason the administration
chose not to call the mining operation a "blockade" and why
Senate Republican Leader Hugh Scott, (R-Pa.) stated "that
the term 'blockade' is a legal term which has a lot of support
in international law," Secretary Laird replied as follows:
Of course, this is not in the terms that you refer
to it, in Senator Scott's terms, and you guote Senator
Scott, a blockade in the international sense, that we
are challenging ships beyond the territorial waters
of North Vietnam. HO are merely giving notification
to all shipping that the harbors of North Vietnam have
been mined, and we have notified the entire world and
we have notified the United Nations that we will not
permit the landing of supplies in North Vietnar.
This is a much different type of action than the
international blockade to which you refer that applies
on the high seas beyond the territorial waters of a
given" country so there Is difference. 140
(Emphasis added)
.
When asked whether the mining and maritime interference
with seaborne shipping deliveries might be considered as a
warlike act against other nation's shipping interests without





The situation in such . . . that mines have been
used by the enemy in the South and in the tributaries
and in the rivers in the South over a period of time.
We have had damage done to [our] ships from the mines
that have been laid by the North Vietnamese. These
have been in most cases Soviet mines that have been
placed in those particular entrances to river facil-
ities and in other areas in the South. I think it is
important to point out that mines have [previously]
been used by the enemy in South Vietnam. 141
Finally, in response to the Question as to whether any
flag ship belonging to a country other than North Vietnam
would be attacked if it attempted to land cargo on the shore,
the Secretary of Defense reiterated the order previously
announced by President Nixon that the United States policy
"is to stop the delivery to the North Vietnamese of these
supplies, and we will take those actions that are necessary
to stop that delivery." ^ 4 ^ (Emphasis added).
E# Evaluation of Strategic Planning, Imple-
mentation and Policy Considerations Related
to United States Naval Interdiction Activitie s
The sudden developments leading up to the President's
mining announcement of May 8, 1972 appears to have been due,
in large part, to the rapid, clandestine and massive North
Vietnamese buildup which apparently surprised U.S. intelligence
1 A *}





source reported that although "we saw the [Communist] hull
[coning], we could not tell when or where he'd strike.' 14
During their assault in the Central Highlands, the
North Vietnamese gained a rrajor tactical surprise - - arc? almost
four or five days of virtually unimpeded advance leading to t
seizure of Cuantri , by hitting when and where it was least
expected. After the North Vietnamese offensive had been launch-
ed, U.S. intelligence sources acknowledged that they had not
suspected that the North Vietnamese would take the "short route"
down Coastal Highway 1. One U.S. intelligence source reported
that " [t]he surprise was that for the first time in 18 years,
the Communists stopped the pretense of 'infiltration' caur
by a 'peoples' civil war and [openly] went down Coastal Big
145
way 1. The sudden appearance of thirty North Vietnamese
tanks, thought to be disassembled and brought south by truck
or river boat, also produced instant and extreme psycholocrical
shock to the South Vietnamese defending forces.
These sudden and successful advances by the North Viet-
namese resulted in severe military losses for the South
Vietnamese including a major debacle where one South Vietnamese
General, Bricradier General Vu Van Giai, actually abandoned his
command post at Quantri when his position wasn't even under
threat of ground attack.
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Such demonstrated weakness on the part of some South
Vietnamese military commanders apparently caused President
Nixon to include a statement in his iMay 8th presentation which
was addressed "to the people of South Vietnam." In this
segment of his speech, the President said:
You shall continue to have our firm support in
your resistance against aggression. It is your
spirit that will determine the outcome of the
battle. It is your will that will shape the
future of the country." 147
Following the President's urging of South Vietnamese
leaders to get tough and show more spirit and leadership,
South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu imposed martial
law in a move to heighten public awareness of the country's
critical military situation. ^ 48
Thus, the President of the United States was not only
faced with a massive movement of North Vietnamese troops
and heavy equipment into the South, but he was also confronted
with the spectre of a rapid deterioration of South Vietnamese
military leadership and battlefield morale. The possibility
of a catastrophic collapse of South Vietnam's military posture
which might have subsequently lead to an election year debacle
after three and one-half years of continued promotion of the
Administration's Vietnamization program, was likely to have
been one of the principal considerations which influenced
President Nixon to order North Vietnam's ports and harbors mined
•66-
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The President's May 8th decision to nine North Vietnamese
waters also had to be carefully considered in light of his
scheduled visit to the Soviet Union which would occur two weeks
hence. (May 22, 1972).
In his May 8th address, the President made several pointed
references to the Soviet Union, the most important of which is
as follows:
I particularly direct my comments tonight to the
Soviet Union. We respect the Soviet Union as a
great power, lie recognize the right of the Soviet
Union to defend its interests when they are threat-
ened. The Soviet Union in turn must recognize our
right to defend our interests.
No Soviet soldiers are threatened in Vietnam. Sixty
thousand Americans are threatened . We expect you
to help your allies, and you cannot expect us to do
other than to continue to help our allies. But let
us, and let all great powers, help our allies only
for the purpose of their defense, not for the purpose
of launching invasions against their neighbors.
Otherwise the cause of peace, the cause in which we
both have so great a stake, will be seriously jeopard-
ized.
Our two nations have made significant progress in our
negotiations in recent months. We are near major
agreements on nuclear arms limitation, on trade, on
a host of other issues.
Let us not slide back toward the dark shadows of a
previous age. We do net ask you to sacrifice your
principles, or your friends, but neither should you
permit Hanoi's intransigence to blot out the prospects
we together have so patiently prepared
.
We, the United States and the Soviet Union, are or the
threshold of a new relationship that can serve not only
the interests of our two countries but the cause of world
peace. We are prepared to continue to build this relation-
ship. The responsibility is yours if we fail to do so. l &-$
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At stake in this calculated gamble of Herculean
proportions, was not only the possibility that the United
States might provoke a major confrontation with the Soviets
in Southeast Asia and in other parts of the World, but that
the detente between the United States and the Soviet Union
which had been so carefully cultivated after years of nego-
tiations, was being threatened with total destruction.
In effect, the President's mining announcement required
the Soviet Union to elect whether contrary to the interests of
World stability, the Soviet Union would continue to provided
the means to its remote and small ally to take over another
small ally of the United States while both were engaqed in
v
fighting one another in the same distant and war torn
land; or whether the Soviet Union would abide by these suggested
and self-imposed rules of intervention which called for a military
response by the superpowers only when the territorial interests
considered vital to each were clearly and convincingly affected.
In taking this calculated risk, the President was relying
heavily upon his judgment that the Soviet Union would not hastily
react to the United States mining measures because (1) these
measures did not, in themselves, constitute a threat to Soviet
vessels on the high seas and were instead strictly limited to
measures affecting North Vietnam's territorial waters, (2)





launching of its heavy offensive into South Vietnam after
150
the Soviets had recommended that the tanks, artillery and
other weapons which they had supplied the North Vietnamese
should not be used until after all American forces had be-
withdrawn, rather than before President Mixon'fl visit to the
Soviet Union had been completed, and (3) because a lonq sought
stabilizing treaty in Central Europe, a highly desired agreement
to limit the arms race between the super powers and an extremely
generous arrangement for trade with access to American techno-
logy were all at stake for the Soviet Union if they chose to
provoke a military confrontation over the President's mining
151
measures.
Another major factor which weighed heavily when the
President made his evaluation of the long range strategic
effects associated with the commencement of his North Viet-
namese mining measures was that the President could also take
effective action against North Vietnam because the Russians and
the Chinese, whose border confrontations had been steadily
growing, had each considered their future links with the United
States to be more important than their present commitments
to Hanoi. On the other hand, the President had to consider
whether his actions might stimulate latent competitive forces
between the Soviets and the Chinese which could compel them to
demonstrate to Hanoi and the Commuinst World the degree of









Indeed, The New York Timesreported that on May 17th/ with
only five days remaining before the arrival of President Nixon
in Moscow, the Soviet media was conveying the impression that
the American measures taken at Haiphong had fostered r
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collaboration between the Soviet Union and China. " Soviet
insiders were reportedly telling friendly diplomats that the
two feuding Communist powers were either about to sign or
had already signed new agreements arranging for the shipment
of Soviet war supplies for Hanoi across China to outflank the
American attempt to choke off supplies by sea. However, the
prevailing view, at that time, was that most of the Soviet
publicity including private leaks, was being given for appear-
ance sake only and did not portend any fundamental easing of
tension between the Soviet Union and China. Indeed, the Soviet
desire to upstage Peking coupled with an almost obsessive fear
of unlimited United States-Chinese cooperation, was rekoned by
Western diplomats as the principal factor for the Kremlin's
153decision not to cancel President Nixon's visit.
Subsequently, a May 2 3rd report from Peking showed that
China had, from the outset, balked at Russian requests that
Soviet bloc freighters carrying supplies to north Vietnam, be
allowed to use Chinese ports. Instead, the Chinese merely
agreed to increase Soviet bloc rail shipments through China
154proper. One diplomatic source reported that this Chinese
refusal was coupled with a suogestion that the Soviets instead




of mine fields. ~" In addition, sources reported that while
the Chinese rail system had geared up for a substantial increase
on rail traffic caused by the requested Soviet accomodation,
the goal of satisfying these increased Soviet cargo requirements
when coupled with a five-fold increase in rail tonnage in order
to compensate for the loss of sea routes, would be extremely
difficult to achieve. 156
Subsequently, a news report from Moscow dated June 18th,
told of Soviet citizens being informed during political lectures
that China had rcategorically refused" to let Soviet ships
1 57
unload supplies destined for North Vietnam at Chinese ports.
(Lectures are a basic form of adult education in the Soviet
Union) . The lecturers told the Soviet public that immediately
after the United States laid the mines along the North Viet-
namese coast on May 8th, nine Soviet minesweepers set out
toward north Vietnam from Vladivostok, Russia's naval base
in the Sea of Japan. One reason these minesweepers were never
used the Soviet audiences were told, was that the United States
could have quickly replaced its mines as soon as they were swept
Russian audiences were also told that China favored heating
up the Indochina war in the Spring of 1972 because the Chinese
hoped this might interfere with President Nixion s visit to the
Soviet Union. However, it was acknowledged that the develop-
ments created by by Mr. Nixon's May 8th mining order severely
complicated preparation for the May, 1^72 summit and caused
71

the Soviet Central Committee to reconsider the desirability of
President Nixon's visit. 158 The Soviet audiences vere told
that the Central Committee decided to go ahead with the Furir.it
after keeping in mind certain "long term consideration?.
"
Canceling the Summit would have meant sacrificing a long list
of important diplomatic opportunities, the lecturers said, and
the results of the Summit proved that this was the right
decision. * 59
The calculated risks which President Nixon took with
regard to his ordering of a naval mining interdiction would
,
of course, only have been undertaken if a significant benefit
for the United States or its ally could have been achieved.
Since 1966, the comparative advantages and disadvantages of
mining North Vietnam's harbors had been actively considered
by United States planners. In 1967, President Johnson refused,
however, to authorize such actions as 'mining" or "quarantine-
interdiction" which were designed, among other things, to
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"decrease the Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuary areas." One
of the most vocal supporters of a tough mining thrust against
the North Vietnamese Communists was Admiral U.S. Hrant Sharp,
former Commander of American forces in the Pacific. Writing
in the Reader's Digestin May, 1969 after he had retired from
the Navy, Admiral Sharp disclosed that he had proposed a plan
which proved to be almost identical to the one ultimately




In advancing his arguments for a United States mining
interdiction operation against North Vietnam, Admiral Sham
asserted that "closing an enemy's harbor is customary and
logical in warfare. "162 Admiral Sharp said that although he
had recommended blocking Haiphong with mines laid by aircraft
which represented the simplest and most effective measure the
U.S. could have taken, these suggestions were always vetoed on
the grounds that it "Would not affect the enemy's capability
163
of waging war in South Vietnam." x In placing the blame for
the "needless casualties" that resulted , Admiral Sharp wrote
that Secretary of Defense Robert C. McNamara arbitrarily and
consistently discarded the advice of his military advisers
while pursuing the campaign on a "gradualistic basis that gave
the enemy plenty of time to cope with our every move
.
,: '
According to The Washington Post the Pentagon Papers
revealed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted Admiral Sharp's
proposal as early as October, 1966. But these recommend-
ations were principally rejected for the following two reasons:
(1) such a move constituted an unacceptable risk with regard to
the Soviet Union which "would place Moscow in a particular
galling dilemma of how to preserve the Soviet position and its
prestige in such a disadvantegous place," 1€6 and (2) these
measures were essentially ineffective since "no combination of
actions [e.g. mining and bombing] against the North short of
destruction of the regime or occupation of North Vietnamese
territory [would] physically reduce the flow [of supplies] needed




Secretary HcNamara also estimated that if Pekina read the mining
of Haiphong as an indication that the United States "was aoincr to
apply military pressure until the North capitulated," the Chinese
might "intervene in the war with combat troops. ..."
Therefore, President Johnson rejected the advice given to him
by Admiral Sharp and the Joint Chiefs of Staff not only because he
was reluctant to risk a clash with the Russians and the Chinese, but
also because he was wary of domestic political opposition if such a
course of action should ever be adopted.
However, beginning in 1969, during President Nixon's "winding
down phase of the war , the debate on the mining plan took on a new
sense of urgency as it related to the President's committment to
accelerate the withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed in Vietnam.
According to The Washington Post a collection of Secret documents
compiled under the auspices of Dr. Henry Kissinger in 1969, showed
that the debate during the early stages of the Nixon Administration
fundamentally followed the position adopted durina the Johnson years.
However, since 80 per cent of all Communist aid passed through the
Port of Haiphong, the Pentagon favored "a strong effort to interdict
road and rail transport" from China to North Vietnam in "a concerted
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air campaign against all transportation. Such moves, Pentagon
analysts said, "would in large part, isolate Hanoi and Haiphong from
each other" and would be "highly effective in reducing North Vietnam's
capability to reinforce aggression in South Vietnam. 170 However,












blockade "would be widespread but temporary' and that the
Worth Vietnamese would find "alternative procedures for main-
taining the flow of essential econonic and military imports"
within two or three months. The CIA said that the North Viet-
namese could continue to recieve supplies from China by rail,
highways or rivers, and therefore the Communists had sufficient
alternative avenues for transporting their supplies. The CIA
report therefore concluded that "total interdiction of seaborne
imports would be difficult because shallow-draft lighters could
171be used to unload cargo from the mined major harbor areas.
Dispite the misgivings expressed by the CIA and other
administration analysts concerning the effectiveness of a Harbor
mining interdiction campaign, the series of sudden military set-
backs for the South Vietnames Armed Forces in the Spring of
1972, coupled with the appearance of enemy convoys of up to
17?200 trucks recklessly running down South Vietnam's major
highways in broad daylight, apparently convinced President Nixon
that he had no alternative but to act decisively.
These convoys carrying ammunition, weapons and fuel for
North Vietnames heavy armored vehicles (some of which consumed
up to 18 gallons of fuel per mile of operation) were, for the
most part, supplied by Soviet ships being offloaded at major
deepwater ports such as Haiphong. Between 35,000 and 40,000
metric tons of fuel had been shipped into North Vietnam by the
173Soviet Union each month. It is also estimated that the
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Soviet Union supplied three times the tonnage of military goods
as was furnished the North Vietnamese by China. 17i?
According to a New York Timesarticle, the mining of
the seven North Vietnamese ports would also cut down on North
Vietnamese food supplies since as much as 4 per cent of North
Vietnam's rice is imported from the Soviet Union and other
175Communist countries. U.S. Defense Department officials
acknowledged that food ships would be kept out of North Viet-
namese ports since the only remaining alternative was to
attempt to stop and search vessels which the United States
had refused to do because of its contention that its current
mining interdiction was not a blockade. According to recent
intelligence reports, approximately 200, 0OC tons of supplies
were delivered to North Vietnam each month, the bulk of which
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was shipped through Haiphong.
Six weeks after the mining if North Vietnam's ports had
been completed, U.S. State Department spokesman, Charles w. Bray
announced that U.S. air strikes on the North Vietnamese trans-
portation network had substantially reduced the flow of military
supplies from China and that over 1000 boxcars had been bottled
i 77
up at the Chinese border. Mr. Bray then said: "What does
seem clear is that the air strikes on the North Vietnamese
transportation network, and particularly the railroads, have
had a very substantial effect, [although] less conclusive perhaps
than the mining of the ports which has had the total effect of
178
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Later, at the Pentagon, a spokesman said that there had been
no movement in or out of North Vietnamese ports since they had
heen mined nor had any mines exploded.
On May 29, 1972, The Via.shington To sta1 so reported that
there was no evidence that either China cr the Soviet Unjr
was attempting to supply North Vietnam fcy air or by ground to
compensate for the reduction la var material caused hy the U.S.
17 r
mining of its ports. A " Another American source said that
North Vietnam had not taken any measures itself to offset the
mining or the renewed U.S. bombing raids although it had three
weeks in which to do so. U.S. intelligence sources noted that
the American strategy in the North was having its intended effect
since the firing of artillery and surface-to air, anti-aircraft
missiles as well as ether offensive weapons vas reported tc have
dropped off sharply. ' These U.S. officials also claim-
that there was already a gasoline shortage in the North.
Although exact figures as to how long it would take usinc? May 8th
as a starting point for the U.S. mining campaign to become
completely effective were not available, military sources did
estimate that it would take between two tc six months for the
U.S. mining campaign to seriously ir the North Vietnamese
war-making capability. It was also noted that as late as
three weeks after President Nixon had announced the mining of
North Vietnamese ports, no indication could be found that the
North Vietnamese were making any effort to repair destroyed or
77-
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18?damaged bridges , roads or rail lines. This inactivity was
in marked contrast to the "Rolling Thunder" bombing campaign
of 1965-1968 when the North Vietnamese, with the aid of some
50,000 Chinese repair crewmen, made almost superhuman efforts
to keep these vital communication lines operating. One
possible explanation may be that O.S. Navy and Air Force air-
craft have had far greater success in hitting their targets
due to the utilization of laser and television guided "smart
bombs." 184
According to informed U.S. sources, the so-called
"smart bombs" which in one instance successfully destroyed, in
a single air strike, the center span of the Thanhhoa Eridge
which had earlier withstood repeated aerial sorties using
conventional bombs, were guided to their target by laser beams
transmitted by attacking aircraft or by mini-T.V. sets carried
in the nose of the bomb depending on which version of the
185
weapon was used. In stressing the accuracy of these new
weapons, military sources said that fewer aircraft releasing
fewer weapons could be used to achieve better bombing results
while minimizing the casualties and damage to civilians and
their property due to the inaccurate or inadvertent delivery
of weapons. The high degree of accuracy of these newly develop-
ed guided weapons is extremely significant since a principal
effect of the U.S. mining campaign is to compel the North Viet-
namese to rely upon road and rail shipment methods since sea-







. Description of Naval Jtoterdiction Techniques
Tnvloyoc by the Unit r- 3 ^qs
1. Composition , Deployment and Tactics of
Unite*1! States Interdiction Forces
A U.S. task force which vas reported to represent the
largest air and naval armada ever assembled off the coast of
Vietnam, mined the entrances of Haiphong a-nd six other ':orth
Vietnamese ports in an attach which commenced on the evening
of May 8, 1972 and which vas successfully concluded a few hours
later when all U.S. aircraft safely returned to their assigned
1S7
carriers. " While the exact number of mines laid wa3 net
disclosed by the Navy, an earlier Pentagon study showed that
a total of only 200 mines which could he dropped by h-C attack
bombers, would effectively seal off virtually all of North
Vietnam's major ports and waterways. The study revealed that
as few as two dozen well-placed mines would be sufficient to
make impassable the 10-mile-long Cua Cam River which leads fror
the Gulf of Tonkin to the Port of Haiphoi
Later, In a news conference on May 10, 1972, Secretary of
Defense Melvin Laird confirmed that on May 8th, at 9:04 P.
Washington time, U.S. Navy aircraft had indeed launched from





mine drops in North Vietnamese harbors utilizing interdiction
techniques which were substantially the same as those outlined
188in earlier Pentagon studies. After the mines had been laid,
the Navy disclosed that its task force had consisted of at least
60 ships including five aircraft carriers with 350 to 4 00
planes aboard, four cruisers and thirty destroyers. ^ 8 ^
The aerial mining of Haiphong Harbor centered on a narrow
channel called the Canal Maritime which had been laboriously
dredged into Haiphong Harbor by the French and later by the
Ijorth Vietnamese. The Canal Maritime is about one mile lorn,
1*50
500 yards wide and drec\csc6 to a depth of about twenty feet.
The mines which the U.S. Navy aircraft laid were set to
become automatically activated after three "daylight periods" 191
or at 1800 hours, Thursday, May 11th, Saigon time. -"~
After this three day "grace period" had elapsed, any shins
which had not yet departed from t*!orth Vietnamese ports would
have to do so at their own peril.
Information as to which type of aerial mines vere lai
( e.g. magnetic, acoustic or pressure) was not initially supplied
by Pentagon sources except to say that the U.S. mines which
were used weighed between 1000 and 2000 pounds and were sown by
carrier aircraft. However, five days later, Pentagon sources
revealed that only the magnetic type of mines had been planted
adding, however, that if any future mining was required, it




activated by pressure or sound.
In addition to planting mines at the entrances of North
Vietnam's harbors, the United States simultaneously laid mines
in North Vietnam's canals, rivers and other inland waterways.
These mines were placed in the Inland waterways as part of an
overall effort to mine "choke points" and other transshipment
locations critical to the North Vietnamese vaterborne supply
196
system. This action was said to be in compliance with the
President's May 8th directive to U.S. forces "to take appropriate
measures within the internal and territorial waters of North
1 07Vietnam to interdict the deliveries of [enemy] supplies."
The initial public disclosure of the measures taken by the
United States were summarized by The New York Times load article
of Tuesday, May 9, 1972 which succinctly outlined the President's
interdiction techniques as follows:
All major North Vietnamese ports would be mined,
ships of other countries in the harbors, most of
which are Russian, would have three "daylight
periods" in which to leave. After that, the mines
will become active and ships coming and going trill
move at their own peril.
United States naval vessels will not search or seize
ships of other countries entering or leaving North





American and South Vietnamese ships and pianos
would take "appropriate measures" to stop North
Vietnam from unloading material on beaches from
unmined waters
.
United States and South Vietnamese forces would
Interdict, presumably by bombing, the movement
of materiel in North Vietnam over rail lines
oriqinatinc in China. *28
Immediately following the President's May 8th announce-
ment, Daniel Z. Henkin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
r
Public Affairs, insisted that the United States mining action
was not a "blockade" and that stopping foreign ships and search-
ing them would not be undertaken by U.S. naval forces.
While small intercoastal cargo vessels and lighters attempting
to offload supplies from ocean going vessels would be subject
to air and sea attack, the Soviet Union, China and other
Communist nations whose large ocean-going ships remained beyond
the North Vietnamese claimed territorial 12-mile-limit would
not be subject to any offensive interdiction measures vhatso-
ever. During cubseguent Pentagon briefings, military analysts
said that a full-scale blockade, in which United States vessels
tried to turn away, stop or search Soviet or Chinese vessels
under threat of sinking them if they failed to heed such a
command, would clearly have raised a totally unacceptable risfc
of major confrontation among the superpowers which the United




However, administration officials distinguished the Trosident's
current mining interdiction campaign by noting that: "If they
[foreign ships] chose to run our minefields and are sunk, [then]
they've been forewarned. That's fundamentally different than
signalling a Soviet vessel to turn back or be shot out of the
water by us. M 201
A synopsis of the courses of action which the United
States was prepared to undertake would therefore appear to be
as follows:
(1) All Ocean-going foreign vessels hound for North
Vietnamese ports would be warned by the United States of the
existence of U.S. mine fields while they were still enroute
to their destination and then warned again while at a
sufficiently safe distance before making their approach to
dangerous coastal waters
.
(2) No attempt to stop any foreign vessel which sought
to penetrate the U.S. mine fields would be undertaken except
to provide specific warning that these vessels were proceeding
at their own peril into mined waters.
(3) Foreign vessels offloading supplies beyond IJorth





shallow draft vessels would not themselves be subject to
attack. However, the barges and lighters would be attacked
by air and naval forces once they had safely cleared the
foreign vessel, had entered territorial waters and were
headed for shore.
(4) No attempts at direct interference with third
country forces (such as Russian minesweepers) attempting to
sweep North Vietnamese harbor approaches would be undertaken.
However, "reseeding" of mine fields previously swept would
be undertaken immediately by U.S. forces as soon as U.S.
mines had been swept.
2 . Notification Methods Employed by the
United States to Warn Foreign Nations
During his May 10th Pentagon press conference, Secretary
of Defense Melvin Laird said that the United States had given
worldwide general notification "that the harbors of North
Vietnam have been mined . . . [and] that we [the U.S.] will not
202permit the landing of supplies in North Vietnam." Presum-
ably, Secretary Laird's reference to notification of "the
entire world" was intended to refer to Special Warning No. 42
(O 09014 2B) which was a naval message transmitted to all mariners
by the Naval Oceanographic Office, Washington, D .C . warning that
84-
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the internal and claimed territorial waters in and around
the entrances to seven North Vietnamese ports had been
Ttiined (See Appendix B) . The third paragraph of this Naval
Messaae advised that:
The Naval Forces of the Republic of Vietnam and the
United States have been instructed to use their best
efforts to insure that all vessels transiting the hiah
seas in this area are notified by appropriate signals
of the above-noted measures being undertaken within
the internal and claimed territorial waters of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
The degree of careful planning and commitment with which
the U.S. Navy approached the problem of giving appropriate
notification to foreign vessels which were about to enter
North Vietnamese mined waters is revealed in a U.S. Seventh
Fleet announcement reporting that a number of U.S. destroyers
assisted by 16 4-foot-long gun boats stationed along the
"notification line" off Vietnam were prepared to uwarn any
merchant ship away from North Vietnam in 1 spoken languages
203
and in the appropriate] international signal codes ."
(Emphasis added)
.
In one such incident, a Russian-speaking £jnerican aboard
the U.S. destroyer escort McMorris hailed the Russian surveil-




Soviet ship away from the nine field at North Vietnam's
second largest port of Vinh. After telling the Russians
that they were about to sail into the U.S. planted mine
field, the Soviets ran up international signal flags which
said: rThank you for your cooperation and have a pleasant
204
voyage," then the Izmeritell altered course arc sailed away.
3* Prel iminary Results of United States
Mining Interdiction Measures
At the time the President made his mining announcement,
37 ships were nearly filling the Port of Haiphong to its capacity.
Of these, 16 were Soviet vessels, 11 were from other Communist
bloc nations and the remainder flew the flags of Somali or
Great Eritiar, with hong Kong registry. z05 Within the three
day "grace period" before the American-laid mines became active,
five vessels, four of them Russian, safely departed the Port of
Haiphong. 206 About one- half of the approximately 25 Soviet
vessels which were then enroute to Haiphoncr when the mining
interdiction was first announced turned back or changed course
907for alternate ports. While few targeting restrictions
remained for U.S. aircraft assigned missions to bomb Kaiphonc?
.
an apparent agreement between the United States and the Soviet
Union to protect the latters trapped vessels, clearly placed
*>flP




Despite the apparent early course changes ordered for Soviet
merchant vessels by the Soviet Union, five cays after the mining
had commenced, a Soviet shipping official revealed that eicrht
Soviet merchant vessels carrying fertilizer, acrricultural mach-
inery, food and clothing were steaming for the Port of Haiphong .20S
Presumanly this order accompanied by the announcement of the
innoffensive nature of the ships' cargoes was made to emphasize
the fact that the United States publically had made no previsions
whatsoever for ships carrying civilian consumer goods to enter
the mined ports and harbors of North Vietnam
.
Lees than ten days after the American mining campaign had
begun, North Vietnamese authorities reported that minesweepinc
operations were being conducted to clear Haiphong's approaches
210
of mines as soon as U.S. planes dropped them. ' The North Viet-
namese claim that ships were moving in and out were difficult
to verify, but, 'independent sources" reported the arrival of a
211
single Hast German ship during the second week of May and
Radio Hanoi claimed that one Japanese ship carrying medical
supplies had gotten through the American "blockade" although the
name of the vessel and the time and place of its departure were
212
not disclosed. In refuting these North Vietnamese claims,
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
said on May 13th at Newport News, Virginia that no attempt by
North Vietnamese minesweepers to clear U.S. mines had been observed
213




Despite conflicting claims as to whether an occasional ship
was fortunate enough to pass through the U.S. mine fields unharm-
ed, one significant fact remains and that is that the hazards and
difficulties for merchant vessels to safely navigate U.S. mine
fields as well as the delays and dangers of using lighters and
barges to transfer cargo ashore, has effectively reduced North Viet-
nam's capacity for seaborne delivery of supplies to a tiny fract-
ion of their pre-May 8th shipping levels. One measure of the
effectiveness of the U.S. mining interdiction campaign was clearly
spelled out by Air Force Lieutenant General George Eade in a
briefing given on June 8 r 1972. At this briefing, General Eade
cited as an indication of the effectiveness of the U.S. campaign,
a decrease in supplies moved by North Vietnamese coastal shipping
to the South. This shipping loss, according to General bade, has
resulted in a reduction of approximately 20,000 tons of supn] ies
a week to the present capacity of virtually no deliveries at
all. 214
Furthermore, despite strenuous efforts which have been
undertaken by the North Vietnamese to reduce the effectiveness of
the U.S. mining campaign by using barges to transfer cargo from
freighters outside the area of its mined ports, the North Viet-
namese have continued to sustain high losses of lighters and
barges in and attempt to circumvent the restrictions imposed by
the U.S. mining measures. According to one news report originating
-88-
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in Saigon, north Vietnamese barges, after receiving supplies
from cargo vessels anchored off the coast of North Vietnam,
attempt during the night, to slip ashore through marshes and
canals not screened off by U.S. mines. But these evasive tactics
are seldom successful because U.E. "high speed", "low, level''
reconnaissance planes are constantly flying over the teach areas
around the seven mined ports and their observers usually sight
the "blockade- running" barges in time to summon bombers to sink
them. 215
Another senior Air Force Officer credited Navy carrier-based
planes for most of these new interdiction measures since the
Seventh Fleet has the primary responsibility for Haiphong and
other coastal areas. He said that unless the barges reach a
tidewater jungle wilderness where they can disperse and be
camouflaged, they are easy targets for attack bombers and are
invariably destroyed. "One day, we caught fifty barges and
destroyed them all," he said. *** Small barges, after being
loaded from freighters, are usually towed in tandem by tugs.
But some wooden barges are more than 100 feet long, and are
self-propelled with a greater cargo-carryincr capacity than a
coastal steamer. " J
The Officer said that the freighters always anchored
safely away from the mined waters. However, he did not indicate




Uhen the mining of North Vietnam's harbors vas first
commenced on May 8, 1972 , Admiral Thomas Moore, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that Seventh Fleet warships would
not intercept supply vessels on the high seas. However, Admiral
Moore also made it clear that if any vessel attempted to land
cargo ashore, Rwe [would] take whatever action is necessary to
prevent this." AX But the high ranking Air Force source inti-
mated that while the ocean-gcinc freighters may be at anchor
in weather protected territorial waters needed for cargo-transfer
operations, these ships were not attacked simply because they
were no longer considered to be on the "high seas.' ; 220 It was
only after the barges had left the "mother ship" that the barges
themselves were subject to attack, he said. 221
Three weeks after this interview had been conducted, the
U.S. Seventh Fleet in a delayed report, announced that U.S.
destroyers sank 13 barges off the coast of North Vietnam 30
miles northeast of Dong hoi in predawn attacks conducted on July
10, 1972. 222
Not only were barges attacked by U.S. forces when they were
"in transit ,: from off shore freighters; but enemy naval bases
had also been hit by U.S. aircraft in an effort to prevent off-
loaded supplies from Chinese freighters anchored off the Port
9*5 T




To date, there have been no reported incidents involving
foreign vessels striking nines or snstaininc damage due to mines
or other unexplained underwater explosions. However, a single
incident involving an underwater explosion which damaged the
U.S. destroyer Harrington was reported on July 18th when the
390 foot ship sustained damage from what was later reported to
be a North Vietnamese laid mine. After sustaining moderate
damage, the Warringtonleft the Tonkin Gulf where it had been
engaged in sinking barges and other craft which were attempting
to ferry war materials ashore from Chinese freighters. The
3,4000 ton Warrington left its station under its own power.
Only one sailor among the destroyer's crew of 270 crewmen was
injured and his minor injuries were quickly treated so that he
225
was able to return to duty.
VJhile the statistics concerning the sinking of enemy barges
is significant, it can not be overemphasized that the mark of a
successful mining interdiction campaign is not necessarily the
number of barges or lighters sunk, but the total amount of sup-
plies which have been eliminated from the enemy's supply lines.
A significant indication of the telling effects which the United
States mining interdiction is causing, can be observed in the
increase efforts which the North Vietnamese have expended in seek-
ing alternate methods of supply and communication and in increased
propaganda efforts designed to curtail and minimize the psycho-




one Communist news agency reported that "youth shock brigades"
are taking a large share of the work in keeping "bridges, high-
ways and ferries open despite heaving tombing" ^6 Th« game-
agency also claimed that sea communications are still functioning
despite American air raids and the mining of ports while "young
seamen have made every effort to ship nore cargoes within a short
927period to bring them safely to their destinations. Countering
these Communist claims, however, are U.S. assertions that Korth
Vietnam "is no longer in a position to send south large amounts
of supplies because communications, railroads, highways and truck
fleets have been seriously damaged and because the supplies of
228fuel and ammunition in depots has been drastically reduce^
After reviewing these conflicting claims, however, one significant
factor still remains, and that is that the more petroleum supplies
which the North Vietnamese are effectively prevented frost receiv-
ing by sea, the more limited and restricted will be the movement
and advances of their mechanized land forces and the more depend-
ent they will become on rail and other modes of transportation.
It may be that it is still too early to accurately assess
the true impact of the U.S. mining interdiction activities on
the Uorth Vietnamese or to intelligently evaluate the competing
and often conflicting claims of both sides. Perhaps, however,
it would be more prudent and realistic to accept the cautious
appraisal made by Secretary of State William P. Pocers when he
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has not succeeded [and] that Hanoi is disappointed v/ith the
outcome of the [recent military] offensive while the U.S. mining
and bombing is [becoming] effective and a number of other govern-
ments want a peaceful solution. "These and other indications in
the Diplomatic Community," the Secretary said, "give us some hope
that the other side is interested in a negotiated peace."
Perhaps the continued implementation of the current U.S. mining
campaign can materially expedite the advent of the meaningful and
long awaited negotiations which are now envisioned by Secretary
Rogers.
G • Reactions to United States Mining
and Naval Interdiction Operations
1 • Domestic Reaction
Amidst vocal, anguished and uncommonly strong cries from
leading Presidential contenders such as Senators Humphrey and
McGovern that President Nixon's decision to mine North Vietnam's
harbors was a "serious escalation" of the war which was fraught
with "unpredictable danger" 23c and represented a "new escalat-
ion [which was] reckless, unnecessary and unworkable" ^31 an<3
risked the possibility of triggering World War III, United States
domestic reaction to the President's move, particularly in the





able patterns of party alignment. While leading Republicans
acclaimed the President's interdiction actions, Democratic lead-
ers, on the other hand, called them reckless. Republican House
Leader Gerald R. Ford ( R- Mich.) said that the President was
"generous in his bid for peace but firm in his determination that
we will not surrender [and that] [t]he only way left to end the
Vietnam war is to deprive the enemy of the supplies he needs to
232
continue the invasion."
Senator Robert P. Griffin of Michigan, the Assistant Republi-
can Leader in the Senate said of the president ' s announcement that
w it was strong medicine but necessary" 233 while Senate Majority
Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) said that the President's decision
"expands the war and makes settlement more difficult." 234
Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Penna
.
) on the other hand
told reporters that "we are probably not in any more danger of a
I
serious confrontation with either Russia or China as a result of
the President's action [and], I assume that they understand [that]
the President will proceed within the rules of war." The Senator
also said that "the decision does not constitute a widening of the
war or a blockade which would interdict third-nation ships at sea,
[since] it's a restriction on supplies . . . [which] should [only]
235have an effect on hampering the North Vietnamese."
Amidst calls for massive marches and rallies in the Capitol
and while speeches delivered both in protest and in support of the
O "^ £
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£ onator Mike Gravel, (D-Alaska)
,
proceeded to read, from the
floor of the Senate, a National Security Study memorandum prepared
by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger setting forth that North Vietnamese
shallow-draft vessels could readily be used to overcome most U.S.
237
mine laying measures.
Following these developments, Senate Democrats met in a
caucus on May 9th, and adopted a resolution by 29 to 14 condemning
the President's action while "disapproving [of] the escalation
of the war." 238
On the opposite side of the issue, the White house mounted
a formidable effort to demonstrate that the President's decision
was supported by the majority of the American public. On Wednes-
day, May 10, 1S72 White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler
released the results of a poll conducted by Opinion Research Corp-
oration indicating that three out of four Americans backed the
President's decision while the first 20,000 telegrams received at
the White House from American citizens indicated that ' ! five to six
to one" were in favor of the U.S. mining.' 1 ^39
The Administration also counter attacked with cabinet-level
spokesman such as Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally who
accused the Democrats of playing politics with the war in such a
manner as to "raise doubts in my mind about their essential com-
mitment to the best interests of the nation." Meanwhile,
Senator Gale McGee (R-Wyo
.
) saw the President's move as being so
serious that "this [was] a time to keep quiet and hope that the
-95-
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President lucks out." 241
Despite the strong rhetoric and the violence of some of the
demonstrations following the President's mining announcement, the
nations' s reaction as a whole to the mining decision was distinct-
ly more muted than the anguished outcry which followed the invas-
ion of Cambodia in May, 1970. Perhaps this wait-and-see attitude
demonstrated by many Americans was taken in the belief that some-
thing more was involved in the President's mining announcement
than met the eye and that the President was also engaged in a com-
plex military-political maneuver with the Soviet Union which ulti-
mately could bring anout a negotiated solution to the war. Sig-
nificant support for such a view was graphically provided to
Americans on May 11 , 1972, the day that U.S. laid mines automatic-
ally became activated, * when Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F.
Dobrynin and the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, Nikolai Patoli-
chev met with President Nixon in the Oval Office of the White
House in what was later described as "affable talks" reaffirming
the likelihood of a scheduled May 22nd U.S. - Moscow Summit meet-
ing.
2 . Soviet Reaction
While the official Soviet news agency Tass quickly bristled






acts" of mining North Vietnamese ports, the Communist news agency
was nevertheless conspicuously silent as to what Moscow's official
response might ultimately be. 2 While this initial six para-
graph Soviet dispatch was relatively free of the usual Co—wist
rhetoric, it did, in fact, clearly focus on what President Nixon
had actually said during his mining address of May 8th. The Tass
report said that while "the Nixon speech contains a lot of assur-
ances that the United States wants to put an end to the war in
Vietnam . . . [the] practical steps including the measures
244
announced by the President, speak of something else.
Tass did report, however, that President Nixon had said that
the blockade "was not aimed against any 'other' nations" and
accurately reported the U.S. President's pledge to withdraw all
forces within four months after a cease-fire and the liberation
of all American prisoners had occurred. 245
Meanwhile, in Helsinki, Finland, U.S. and Russian negotiators
met as scheduled on the day following the U.S. mining announcement
in a continuation of their Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
.
The only reported departure from normalcy was the late arrival of
the Soviet delegation to the 122nd session. The Soviet delegation
which was headed by chief negotiator Vladimir S. Semenov, deviated
only slightly from its pattern of perfect punctuality by arriving






A similar desire on the part of Russian negotiators to
continue, in spite of U.S. mining measures, to negotiate those
agreements which were important to the Soviet Union was also
reported by Secretary of the Navy John W. Warner, the chief U.S.
negotiator at the U.S. - Soviet talks concerning naval incidents
on the high seas. Secretary Warner, while entertaining a group of
senior Russian naval officers, the first to visit the United States
since World War II, provided the following anecdote;
[On] [t]he night the President announced the mining
of Haiphong, I was having a dinner for the Russians
in my home ... by pure coincidence at nine [P.M.],
the hour of the [President's] speech. I greeted
[the Russians] at the door, giving them not a vodka
but whiskey - a Virginia bourbon whiskey cocktail.
[D]uring the [President's] speech they received a
simultaneous translation. At the end [of the Pres-
ident's speech] there was not one word of acrimony.
The chief of the Soviet delegation, Fleet Admiral
Vladimir Kasatonov got up and said, 'Secretary Warner,
shall we continue to enjoy the evening."' 247
When the Soviet Union did finally issue its long awaited
statement, the fact that it contained no ultimatum was considered
as a favorable sign. The Soviet Statement, while resolutely
condemning the United States "blockade" as a gross violation of
the generally recognized, principle of freedom of navigation" as
well as a violation of the 1958 Geneva Conventions and the basic
requirements of international law, did not set a firm deadline for






The first U.S. reaction to the Soviet response concern-
ing the mining interdiction was that the Soviet statement
constituted a delaying action in order to obtain more time
for internal deliberations at home and for secret diplomacy
abroad. In addition, it was widely believed by U.S. observers
that the Russians were particularly eager to upstage their
Chinese adversaries in relations with the United States and
wanted to avoid, at all costs, anything that might jeopardize
West Germany's ratification of treaties accepting its present
European boundaries. Many of the above mentioned gains
which the Soviets had hoped for, could have been delayed or
postponed - - in fact, it was Mr. Uixon's preliminary judge-
ment that the Soviet leaders would probably rescind their
invitation until the harbor blockage had been lifted. 25C
However, it was also believed just possible that Hanoi had
strained its relations with the Soviet Union in attempting to
embarrass the Soviets over President Nixon's visit so that
the Russians were no longer willing to run any serious risks
on behalf of the North Vietnamese leadership.
The White House had repeatedly argued to the Soviet
Union that nothing in Indochina vas vital enough for either
of the superpowers to justify the destruction of their
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harbors was merely meant to compensate for the heavy
weapons which the Soviet's had provided for Hanoi's offens-
ive. -^ Whether the reasons cited herein were of any
major importance in convincing the leaders of the Soviet
Politboro not to cancel the scheduled Summit meeting or
whether other categories of controlling considerations
prevailed, is impossible to ascertain at this time. One
thing remains apparent, and that is the desire of the
Soviets to continously restrain themselves in reacting to
the American mining policy was clearly of paramount import-
ance to the Soviet Union in light of the long term benefits
to be gained as compared to the short term inconveniences
and delays which the Soviets might encounter. Were it not
for the careful planning and prudent consideration shown
the Soviet Union by the United States through timely notifi-
cation and candid disclosure of our intentions, the outcome
of the U.S. Mining campaign and. the Summit meeting held







V. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES HIKING
AND NAVAL INTERDICTION OPERATIONS CONDUCTED
IN NORTH VIETNAMESE TERRITORIAL WATERS
A. Comparison Between the 1972 United States
Mining Interdiction and the United States
Cuban Missile Quarantine of 196
2
1 • Similarities Between the 1962 Cuban
!!*S3ile Quarantine and the 1972
Mining Interdiction Carpaian
3 • Necessity and Proportional i ty_
Considerations
President Nixon, like President Kennedy ten years
before him., relied heavily upon the provisions of Article
51 of the United Nations Charter in justifying the aining
interdiction measures which he had ordered taken on May 8,
1972. Both Presidents Kennedy and Nixon asserted that the
United States was clearly confronted with an Imwfll it m
threat which reauired that the inherent right of collective
self-defense provided for under the U.N. Charter be immed-







Article 51 provides in part that 'Nothing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent rioht of
individual or collective self-defense if an tXMd attack
occurs aaainst a member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to main-
tain international peace and security. ..."
While Article 51 provides ^cr the exercise of the
"individual" and the " collective rJ richt of self-defense,
both in the Cuban missile crisis and the North Viet-
namese mininrr interdiction campaign, United States
decision makers couched the invocation of this inherent
riqht almost entirely in terms of beino a collective self-
252defense measure.
The two primary legal requirements which must both
be shown to exist for the lawful invocation of the doc-
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Necessity has traditionally been structured in rather
narrow and abstract terms. Decision makers have attempted
to limit lawful anticipatory self-defense by projeotinc a
customary requirement that the expected attack exhibit so
hiqh a decree of imminence expressed in terms of beinr
-102-
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"crreat and immediate" or 'compelling and instant" so as
to preclude effective resort by the intended victim to
254
effective non-violent modalities of proportional response.
These unfortunate an<' anachronistic terms of dire
compulsion appear to have been generated in the after-
math of the Caroline case by Secretary of State Webster
when he formulated the requirements of necessity alonq
lines closely resembling the law of s«2lf-defense used in
domestic law.
255In the Caroline case, a steamer of that name
was utilized to transport personnel and equipment from
United States territory to Canadian rebels by crossing
the Niacrara River to a rebel held island and from there
to the mainland of Canada. The United States did nothincr
to prevent the rebels from benefitting from the use of
this United States sancttiary. Because of this inaction,
Canadian troops were compelled to cross into United States
territorv and destroy the Caroline by setting her adrift
so that she was wrecked on the Palls. Great Britian
claimed that the conduct of the Canadian troops was
justifiable sel^-defense. The United States mace several
feeble responses and the incident ultimately led to the
tacit acceptance by the United States of the validity of
-1C3-
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the initial self-defense claims which Great Britian had
asserted.
In the liaht of the rapidity with which a modern
military aagressor czn jeopardize the security of a tareret
state, it would seem that Secretary of State Mobster's
unfortunate formulation of the requirements of national
self-defense as involving a "necessity of that self-defense
[which] is instant, overwhelming , and leaving no choice of
moans and no moment of deliberation" is so narrow and un~
realistically restrictive that in the era of highly mobile
mechanized armor offensives as well as thermc nuclear
missile delivery techniques, it would be unrealistic to
insist that decision makers defer decisive action until it
was entirelv too late. 25 °
Requirements of Proportionality
In describing the coordinate requirements of pro-
portionality when ascertaining the validity of a claim of
self-defense, Professor McDouaal and Dr. Feliciano have
written that:
Proportionality in coercion constitutes a
requirement that responding coercion be
limited in intensity and maanitude to what
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is reasonably necessary promptly to secure the
permissible objectives of self-defense. For
present purposes , these objectives ray be most
comprehensively Generalized as the conserving
of important values by compelling the opposing
participant to terminate the condition which
necessitates responsive coercion. 257
In the Case of President Kennedy's guarantine-inter-
diction action, the magnitude and the intensity of the
United States responding coercion was precisely tailored
to meet the emeraing threat with which the nation v/as
faced. In expressing the belief that the U.S. formulation
and implementation of the Cuban naval quarantine-inter-
diction amounted to the least possible use of the military
instrument,, Professor William T. Mallison, Jr. in a work
entitled 'Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction
National and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under Inter-
national law' : has concluded that:
Any lesser use [of ^orcel would have amounted to
[an] abandonment of the military instrument and
[resulted in the] exclusive reliance upon non-coer-
cive procedures which most certainly would have
been ineffective without supporting military
power. The quarantine-interdiction clearly meets
the reguirement of reasonable necessity in its
most stringent form. In the same way, the pro-






While the proportionality and necessity require-
ments which were needed to satisfy the collective self-
defense standards of Article 51 were clearly and con-
vincingly established by the United States during the
Cuban missile crisis, it does not necessarily follow
that any other situation such as a threat to the safety
and the integrity of U.S. forces in South Vietnam must
also reach the exact level and intensity of the 1962
missile crisis in order to support a valid self-defense
claim. In other words, while it is difficult to imaaine
a situation since October of 1962 in which a more extreme
and apparent threat to the United States has been shown
to exist, it does not necessarily follow that a more
remote and less immediate threat to the United States
mainland and its people, such as in the case of the 1972
Spring offensive in South Vietnam, would net also, under
the circumstances, be able to satisfy the requirements
of Article 51. For while the President may have chosen
for foreicm ancl domestic political purposes to stress the
jeopardy of the lives of 60,000 Americans in South Viet-
nam during his speech, he alwo acknowledged that a failure
on the part of the United States to effectively repel the
North Vietnamese invading forces would , in essence , mean







17 million South Vietnamese over to Communist tyranny
and terror." ^59
In terms of the immediacy of the threat to those
South Vietnamese living in the Central Hicrhlands of our
small ally, the threat imposed by the full scale, twelve
division, North Vietnamese Army invasion of Spring, 1972
should have more than satisfied the self-defense necessity"
requirements of Article 51.
While the proportionality requirements of self-defense
will be reviewed acrain later in this thesis, it should
suffice , at this point, to say that both the Cuban quar-
antine and the North Vietnamese mining interdiction appear
to amply meet requisite self-defense standards. While
both were hichly selective, all though entirely different
types of interdiction measures, each interdiction policy
was carefully tailored to precisely meet the political and
military demands placed on our respective decision makers
during each critical period.
b . Claims of Interference with
Navigation on the High Seas
During both the Cuban missile crisis and the current
United States mining campaicm, Communist claims criticizing
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United States interdiction measures for an abridgment
o* high seas rights of navigation have repeatedly been
e. While the Soviet Union, durino the Cuban ir.issile
crisis found it to its advantage to quickly drop such
an untenable assertion, the Russians and the Chinese,
more recently, have become Increasingly steadfast in
their position that their ri<7ht to unrestricted naviga-
tion had been abridged bv the U.S. mining measures
commencing on May 8, 1972. 26G While the official
Chinese statement referred to the American mining meas-
ures as an J act of war escalation by U.S. imperialism"
which "grossly violates the freedom of international
trade , " the Soviets , en the other hand , took a more
olobal approach seyina that the minincr interferes with
access of foreign ships to North Vietnamese territorial
and inland waters anc thus creates a "direct threat to the
ships and to the lix^es of seaman of ttany states . . .
.
:I
Obviously, the historic concept of "blockade" itself
focuses on the very need for interference with the free-
of international navigation of non-belliferent nations
by belligerents imposinq restrictive measures on non-bel-
liaerent commercial traffic navigating on the high seas.
That a quarantine or maritime interdiction policv, to a






maritime trade should therefore cone as no great surprise.
For in modern £imes , the desire by decision makers to im-
pose maritime restrictive measures which lessen the likeli-
hood of the unnecessary destruction of human values while
continuing to maintain a high decree of military effective-
ness has often been a controlling consideration in resolving
a variety of recent crisis management situations.
In discussing the lack of universal or positivistic
rules of developed law in the field of maritime restrictive
measures, Professor Neil H. Alford has noted that:
... it has become almost routine to tolerate
naval interferences with shipping in areas in which
tensions are great, as in the Formosa Straits or
Caribbean, with little more than token protests.
Policy makers of states have been conditioned to
accept naval interference without a routine vio-
lent response although protests may be filed. . . .
This general attitude seems to be based upon four
factors: (1) The close control maintained by the
state over its naval forces and the high degree
of discipline of officers and men which the efficient
conduct of naval affairs requires; (2) The usual
familiarity of naval officers with international
law pertaining to their duties; (3) The lack of an
adequate system of international police upon the
high seas; and (4) The range of persuasion and
coercion of which a naval force is capable. 262
Furthermore, naval interdiction of territorial and
inland waters in both South and North Vietnam by surface
craft and mine warfare forces did not suddenly commence
-109-
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with the President's Hay 8th interdiction order. The
practice by both Communist and Allied forces of mining
inland and territorial waters had long been in effect.
As was pointed out by Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird in his press conference of May 10, 1972:
The situation is such that mines have been
used by the enemy in the South and in
tributaries and rivers in the South over a
period of [years] . We have had damage done
to [our] ships from mines that have been
laid by the North Vietnamese. These mines
that have been placed in those particular
entrances to river facilities and in other
areas of the South. . . . 26:*
Furthermore , while the observance of the rights of
foreign vessels to engage in international trade and to
obtain access to a nation's territorial waters has long
been recognized, these riqhts are not considered to be
*) (k A
absolute. ** For instance, while the riaht of innocent
passage of an international strait, which mav also be part
of a nation's territorial sea is generally recognized as
a right of navigation, this right as to all types of
cargoes and craft, is not without restriction. A coastal
state may, for instance, without discrimination temporarily
suspend in "specified areas" of its territorial sea, the









suspension is essential for the protection of its
security. Commencing in 1S65, such measures were
employed by the South Vietnamese to prevent infiltration
of war goods by sea and to subject all vessels "not clearly
engaged in innocent passage' to visit and search procedures.
It would therefore seem that while in both the Cuban
missile crisis and in the current North Vietnamese mining
interdiction campaign/, protests have been raised by Communist
countries with regard to U.S. interference with foreign
shipping, the controlling consideration is not so much a
guestion of slavishlv responding to such protests, but of
instead avoiding the type of interdiction measures which,
under the circumstances, are the most likely to provoke an
uncontrolled confrontation in the first place.
c * Claims of Unlawful, Unilateral
Imposition of Maritime Blockade
As was the case during the Cuban crisis, claims
pertaining to the unlawful , unilateral imposition of
the current U.S. mining interdiction campaign appear to
fall into two general catagories. The first catagorv of
claims which favors the condemnation of current U.S.
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mining measures arises from intense domestic criticism or
the President's action and holds that since there has been
no "Declaration of War" , there can be no lawful interdiction
because one of the essential elements of a lawful blockade
is lacking. The second category of claims favors castigating
the United States because ^blockade" is one of the sanctions
specifically contained in Article 4? of the U.K. Charter as
a measure which may onlv be imposed by the Security Council
in order to lawfully maintain or restore international peace
and security.
As for the first claim asserting that there must be
a declaration of war in order to support the President's
mining interdiction measures, there would appear to be at
least two apparent replies. First, a declaration of war is
not required since, in the words of Professor John Norton
Moore, the "applicability of the law of blockade depends on
the factual existence of a state of internal hostilities and
does not rerruire a formal declaration of war" as, for example,
was the case during the Korean "police action" when the U.S.
maintained a blockade along the entire Korean coastline.
Second , the mining interdiction measures which the President
ordered taken on May 8, 1972 did not constitute a blockade
since these measures were exclusively limited to North Vietnam's
"internal and claimed territorial waters" and did not purport





such as visit and search upon the hiah seas. 26 '
This latter supportive reasoning would seem to be
especially valid since the Cuban quarantine-interdict-
ion, long since recognized as a tightly controlled and
moderated interdiction measure, was not considered
by many authorities to be a blockade in the leqal
sense while nevertheless making sianificantly broader
claims than the current U.S. mininq interdiction
campaign in North Vietnam. In sharp contrast to the
Cuban quarantine, which included provisions for stopping,
warning, visitina and searching foreiqn vessels on the
high seas, the current mining interdiction campaign has
made virtually no claims whatsoever as to hiah seas
merchant shipping except to provide specific warnings
to foreign vessels which may be approaching mined
conditions in North Vietnam's internal or claimed
territorial waters
.
As to the second category of claims relating to
tine issue of whether the United States has unilaterally
imposed a sanction which, under Article 42 of the U.M.
Charter, may only be collectively imposed bv the
Security Council - - the answer would appear to lie in
the interpretation of Article 42 itself. Regrettably,
Article 42 has itself been criticized as representing





and bad draftsmenship. It is also by no means clear
whether the drafters of the Charter intended the maritime
restrictive measure of "blockade" to be imposed solely by
the Security Council as opposed to permitting individual
member states to unilaterally impose such a sanction
under Article 51 of the Charter.
The pertinent portions of Article 42 provide in part
that the Security Council "may take such action by air,
sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security. Such action
may include demonstrations , blockade, and other operations
by air, sea, or land forces of members of the United
Nations." (Emphasis added). While such a sanction may
be imposed by a collectivity of member nations pursuant to
Article 42, it does not follow that individual member nations
themselves are precluded from utilizing blockade as a per-
missible self-defense measure. Such a conclusion would seem
to be supported by the observation that Article 51 of the
Charter preserves to the individual member states the inher-
ent right of self-defense if an armed attack occurs and that
the permissible objects of self-defense as well as the Char-
ters goals of maintaining international peace and securitv
would be defeated if an effective and value conservina sanct-





a member state in its exercise of its inherent riant of self-
defense un<ler Article 51. To hold otherwise would seen to
invite individual member states to exercise their right of
self-defense through alternative albeit more destructive means
not expressly contained in Article 42.
Finally, the view expressed by Professor W.T. Malliscn
as to the desirability of keepinc maritime restrictive meas-
ures fully available for use by nations both individually and
collectively would appear to be well taken when Professor
Malliscn observes that:
A careful lecral appraisal should avoid automatically
ruling out the drastically restricted use of naval
power either in limited war or coercive situations
short of war. VThether it is termed "limited naval
blockade," cuarantine-interdiction," ... or given
another label, one 3hould be slow to condemn as
illegal such limited measures especially when they
are used to maintain world miblio order. ^69pu c
2 • Significant Differences Between the 1962
Cuban Missile Quarantine and the Present
U.S. Mining Interdiction Campaign
a • Nature of Objectives
Unlike the Cuban missile crisis of 19(52 where the




than fifty offensive Soviet missiles from the Soviet
Union's "host state, : the current minincr interdiction
of North Vietnam is a large scale and comprehensive
attempt to prevent the delivery of alJL supplies to an
enemy presently engaging in offensive operations against
the United States and its South Vietnamese ally. V?hile
the United States had also announced the important
objective of preventing the further introduction of
offensive missiles into Cube, the paramount U.S. concern
was not the presence of Soviet missiles in transit on
the high seas, but the elimination of those nearly
operational missiles which were already in place on Cuban
soil. Since the United States could not, short of an
invasion, effectively neutralize the offensive missiles
already in place, it became the primary objective of
President Kennedy's Proclamation to induce negotiations
with the Soviet Union for the removal of thisobvious
threat to the American heartland. The Soviet Union as
the manufacturer, shipper and "consignee" of these missiles
was also the intended recipient and user of these weapons.
Therefore, it was the Soviet Union and not Cuba which
was the real party in interest.
The present U.S. raining interdiction, on the other




target state, and not those nations , such as the Soviet
Union and China, which are delivering the bulk of North
Vietnam's military and civilian supplies. Therefore, the
current U.S. mining campaign has not been instituted for
the removal of any offensive weapons but for the prevention
and disruption of their supply . Since the United States
has made it clear that it is the North Vietnamese which
are considered the aggressors and not the nations providing
war materials to that country, the objectives of the current
mining interdiction measure are controlled by the U.S.
desire to exert the strongest pressures possible on its
adversary while attempting to avoid altogether any direct
confrontation with those nations providing North Vietnam
with its supplies.
Thus, the current decision by the United states to limit
its actions to selective mining of North Vietnam's waters
whereby foreian shipping nations can chose to avoid such a
danger, has total Iv eliminated the necessity of instituting
measures similar to those required during the Cuban missile
crisis reguirina the confrontation and searching of foreign
shipping while still in transit on the high seas. Finally
the nature of the ultimate objectives of the Cuban quarantine
which in 1962 was principally limited to a massive type of
offensive weapon and those objectives sought during the current
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mining campaign are, in themselves , exactly opposite:
In Cuba, the U.S. objective was to prevent the possibility
of a war from ever beginning while in North Vietnam, the
4
U.S. objective is to bring an existing war to its final
end.
b. Scope of Operations
Any comparison of the sicmificant differences between
the scope of the naval interdiction operations conducted
in Cuba in 1962 and of those commenced in North Vietnam
ten years later, would have to center around the relative3.y
narrow limits imposed by U.S. decision makers as to the
interception of 'offensive cargoes" which were subject to
the 1962 guarantine in the Carribean and the prevention of
the delivery of "any supplies" in 1972 to our foes in North
Vietnam.
In President Kennedy's Cuban Proclamation, the follow-
ing supplies were declared to be prohibited materiel:
Surface-to-surface missiles; bombers aircraft; bombs?
air to surface rockets and giiided missiles; warheads
for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electrical
eguipment to support or operate the above items and
any other classes of materiel designated by the




As a auick review of this list of prohibited
materiel readily discloses, virtually all of the items
which were subject to quarantine were massive pieces of
Soviet weaponry. In North Vietnam, on the other hand,
a broad array of smaller sized munitions and war
materiel such as small caliber ammunition , weapons,
grenades am3 the like were either being shipped in
vessels which looked alike, or mixed together with
Soviet bloc shipments including heavy military equip-
ment and bulky consumer coods. Therefore, aerial
detection of vessels believed to be carryina these mixed
carcroes to North Vietnam., would not have yielded the
same precise information as to the quantity and quality
of the offensive weapons being carried by merchant
vessels as was provided United States decision makers
durincr the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Accordingly,
the scope of naval interdiction operations currently
being conducted in North Vietnam must, of necessity, be
much broader than the Cuban quarantine since selective
interception of Soviet and Communist bloc maritime
traffic on the hiah seas is not politically feasible and
the areas of strategic sicmificance include, at the
present time, at least seven North Vietnamese Ports and
a number of Inland canals and tributaries.









prohibit all foreicrn nations ^rom delivering seaborne
supplies to North Vietnam has been pointed out by Deputy
Secretary of Defense Kenneth Rush during a May 9th tele-
vision interview, when the Secretary said:
Yes , we're saying that we cannot distinguish
between ships that carry munitions of war and
ships that micrht be carrying food. Therefore,
we cannot allow any cargoes to reach shore. 271
(Emphasis added)
.
Because the United States is compelled to deny the
North Vietnamese all imported materials, the effects of
the U.S. mining interdiction are felt equally among the
military and civilian segments of the North Vietnamese
population. However, before scorn and criticism is heaped
upon American decision makers for arriving at a mining
interdiction policy which might be criticized by some as
an excessively harsh and inhumane decision to deprive the
North Vietnamese civilian population of needed fuel, cloth-
272ing and foodstuffs, it should be pointed out that mil-
itarily speaking, the deprivation of civilian supplies is
considered to be the very function of a blockade or maritime-
interdiction since it forces an enemy to ration, divert or
otherwise conserve his existing war supplies and scarce
natural resources. For instance, during the Korean War, the
-120-
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United Nations Command prohibited coastal as well as deep-
sea fishincr by the North Koreans . The principal reason
for justifying such a prohibition was "that this sea food
was legitimate contraband and should be stringently denied
[to] the Communists. The restriction on fishina by the
U.N. blockading force would serious Iv add to the Communist
logistics problems ashore, and force then? to import fish
273from Chinese and Russian sources."
In much the same wav that the U.N. maritime restrict-
ions caused the North Korean Communists to seek foodstuffs
from the Soviets and the Chinese in lieu of receiving
weapons which would have ordinarily occupied the same mer-
chant vessel's carero space, the current U.S. mining campaign
may produce the same type of results although it is prin-
cipal!^/ the heavy weapons, war materials and fuel supplies
being shipped to North Vietnam by sea which has caused the
United States to institute its present inderdiction measures
In any event, despite the significant differences
between the naval interdiction operations which were con-
ducted in Cuba in 1962 and those which are presently being
conducted in North Vietnam , there is a common thread
running throughout the two measures which is that they both
have contained within them carefully imposed limitations






to achieve military and political effectiveness while
attemptincr to avoid excessive burdens or irreparable
harm for each affected country's non-combatant population.
c * Duration of the Campaicro
Perhaps the most obvious difference between the 1962
Cuban quarantine-interdiction and the current U.S. mining
campaign is the amount of time taken to implement and
successfully complete each of these operations.
In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, President
Kennedy issued his Proclamation on October 23 , 1962 to
become effective at 2:00 P.M. on October 24th, Greenwich
time. Within three days after the commencement of the
quarantine, a series of letters was exchanged between
President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, whereby it
was agreed that the Soviets would dismantle their offen-
O T A
sive weapons systems and return them to the Soviet Union.
On November 2nd, the President made an interim report
to the American people wherein he stated that aerial
photographs indicated that the Soviet type offensive
missiles had been dismantled and the Cuban missile sites
075
were beina destroyed. Subsequently, United States
Naval forces verified that various "homeward bound" Soviet
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vessels were carrvinc what appeared to be offensive type
276
missiles or their supporting components as deck cargo.
These Soviet vessels were visually observed to be carrying
forty-two crates which appeared to contain the missiles
or related equipment. 27^ Thereafter , the quarantine was
terminated on November 21 , 1962 when President Kennedy
received assurances from Chairman Khrushchev that the
remaining Soviet jet bombers would be withdrawn within
thirty days. The U.S. Cuban quarantine was therefore
terminated in less than a months time after it had started
with a peak military operative period lasting less than
ten days.
By contrast, the duration of the U.S. minina inter-
diction measures conducted in North Vietnam's territorial
waters has, as of this writing, already lasted over three
months and will not be considered to have had its intended
278
effect until six months from the date of its inception.
While the total time which the U.S. mining interdiction
will remain in effect is highly conjectural, it certainly
can be said , at this point in time, that its duration and
effects will outlast those of the Cuban crisis by a factor










ryolutionary Trends Arisincr From the
Circumstances Surrounding the Current
U.S. Mining Interdiction Campaign
* • Localization o f Impact
One of the requirements associated with the 'tr^
itional law of blockade" embodied in the Declaration of
Paris of 1856 and the Declaration of London of 1909 was
that the blockading forces must have been deemed capable
of enforcing a continously effective interdiction measure
which prevented both the entry and exit of ships from the
279blockaded area. The historic concept associated with
this reguirement of "effectiveness" was commonly interpret-
ed to reguire an indeterminate number of ships of war so
situated as to bring about a reasonable expectation that
a vessel seekina to breach the blockade would probably be
captured. 280
The early nineteenth century situation usually assoc-
iated with the maintenance of a continuous force capable
of blockading a given geographic area was a cordon of
surface cruisers hovering a few miles off the enemy's
coast. It was, at one time, even insisted that a "closed"
or stationary cordon as distinguished from a cruising
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patrol was essential in order to maintain the requisite
281decrree of effectiveness of a naval blockade. The
lecral requirements for the so-called "close in" blockade
were principally formulated and advanced by the United
States and British strategists in an effort to minimize
the effects of third party nations attempting to interfere
with neutral American and British shipping.
However, after the experiences of two World Wars
which saw the major powers introduce and later perfect the
so-called "long distance blockade** - - which relied heavily
upon a combination of mine fields, surface patrols and
associated measures - - the future utilization and success
of the close in type blockade was thought to be virtually
eliminated. 282 This alteration in the traditional concepts
pertaining to the "close in" blockade became necessary
because of the extended range of shore artillery batteries,
the emergence of fast torpedo boats and the development of
long range aircraft and submarines. Any attempt for a
blockading surface force to try to maintain a close in
type blockade against the modern weapons of the future,
was though to be not only an economically, unworkable
measure, but also a militarily disastrous course of
action to undertake. Therefore, only broad based, long







wave of the future. To a certain extent this prediction
was accurately borne out since the only reported instance
of a "close in M type blockade duriner the Second World VJar
was that naval interdiction measure instituted by the
Soviet Union against Finland in the Russo-Finnish War of
1939. 283
However, the Korean conflict saw a resumption of the
traditional type of close in coastal blockade principally
because the United States possessed air and naval superior-
ity and the Russians , who were in effect fighting the war
by proxy, chose not to introduce any of their air or sub-
marine forces into the conflict.
However, after the passage of a decade of development
in the fields of long range bombers and intercontinental
ballistic missile deliver*/ 3vs terns, the likelihood of the
reapplication of a blockade, in any fprrn, was thought to
be highlv unlikely by military and civilian defense plan-
ners since the outcome of any nuclear scale conflict
would be decided in only a fraction of the time necessary
to even begin a blockade*
However, the 1962 Cuban quarantine-interdiction
re-established the validity of the maritime interdiction
process as a measure having great potential for use in




Ourin-7 the Cuban missile quarantine* not only were
claims pertaining to the exclusion of prohibited subject
tter carefully United , but claims pertainina to the
location of any possible areas of maritime confrontation
were similarly reduced. Unlike the "lone, distance''
type blockades of World War I and II , where throughout
every part of the world, maritime commerce was subject
to sweeping controls and tight restrictions,, in Cuba,
on the other hand, the United States chose merely to
designate a single "interception zone" in the Caribbean
Ocean where only those ships which Might be carrying
Soviet offensive missiles and aircraft could be stopped,
boarded or inspected.
A continuation of the trend which appears to have
evolved from the concept of limited inspection zones or
"maritime confrontation areas" and which was embodied in
the Cuban missile Proclamation has also been incorporated
in President Nixon's mining interdiction order of 1972
which limits U.S. offensive measures to the 'internal and
claimed territorial waters of North Vietnam while avoid-
ing altogether any possible maritime confrontation on the
high seas. By carefully limiting the scope of these mining
measures to sever :?orth Vietnamese ports and their assoe-
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iated inland canals and tributaries , the United States
has significantly reduced the area of maritime impact
pertaining to foreign shipping and has narrowed the scope
of those "confrontation" areas affected to nearly coincide
with those of the old-style "close in" type blockade.
It would indeed be difficult to imagine just how U.S.
decision makers could have desicined a maritime interdiction
measure with a smaller zone of impact and still retained
the high degree of military effectiveness which has thus
far been achieved. By carefully limiting the areas which
have been mined to North Vietnamese inland and claimed
territorial waters , the United States has insured that
neither foreign vessels transiting the areas adjacent to
North Vietnam nor those foreign vessels bound for that
country's mined harbors and port facilities are in any way
interfered with while they continue to remain on the high
seas.
2. Decrree of Notification
- -^ |-
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Under the historic concepts associated with maritime
blockade, a maritime interdiction measure did not become
effective until the appropriate notification of the












to the proper port, consular and diplomatic authorities. ^
While some nations such as France and Italy had tradition-
ally ordered their blockading men-of-war to board every
approaching neutral vessel and notify her of the establish-
ment of the blockade , other countries including Japan,
Great Britian and the United States, did not consider such
individual notification to be essential for the effective
institution of a blockade. 2S6
With the advent of the lono distance type blockade
which was employed durinc the course of World. Wars I and
II, the ability of the blockadinc nation concerned to give
individual notification to each vessel approaching a
blockaded area was determined to be totally infeasible.
This lack of ability to provide specific warning to
approachincr vessels not only stemmed from the enormous
expanses of ocean areas which were declared "war zones, : ^°'
but it also stemmed from the fact that much of these ocean
areas were beimr blockaded almost exclusively through the
use of an entirely uncommunicative instrumentality called
the naval magnetic mine.
Furthermore, once hostilities had commenced during
such unlimited wartime situations (as occurred in the
Pacific in December, 1941) , not only did the combatants
fail to describe blockaded areas in terms of the outside
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geographic perimeter-limits of these enormous ocean areas
called "war zones," but the entire theaters of operation
themselves were described in such sweeping terms as to
constitute no notification whatsoever. For instance, the
Secret U.S. message sent on December 7 , 1941 to EXECUTE
AGAINST JAPAN UNRESTRICTED AIR AND SUBMARINE WARFARE,
included no provision whatsoever concerning operational
areas except that for the purpose of command control
acrainst Japan, all of the Pacific Ocean areas were declared
288
a theater of operations. As a result of the unrestrict-
ed U.S. Naval wartime policy in the Pacific, American sub-
marines and aircraft established massive blockades through-
out Japan's inland and territorial waters as well as in
289Japanese controlled ocean and river areas. In virtually
everv case, the establishment of the blockaded areas
through the use of submarine and aerial laid mines was
totally unannounced, and it remained for a passing ship
or barcje to subsequently verify the blockading mine field's
presence and precise location.
In sharp contrast to the establishment of the far-flung
and unannounced Pacific mining blockades of World War II,
there has evolved from the Cuban and North Vietnamese
maritime restrictive measures, communications techniques
which have provided, under the circumstances, the highest
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Durino the Cuban quarantine, both U.S. air and naval
craft were used to intercept those Soviet controlled
merchant vessels headed for the cruarantine zone which
had not previously been instructed by the Soviet Union to
return home. During the Cuban crisis, notification of the
establishment of the U.S. quarantine-interdiction was
provided by special and general communications techniques
on a scale never before seen in the history of naval
blockade. Not only were individual Soviet chartered and
controlled surface vessels selectively notified of the
existence of the Cuban quarantine by voice and by visual
communications, but submerged Soviet submarines as well
were signaled through the use of harmless underwater
explosive sound sianals utilizing the international recog-
nition code "IDKCA" meaning rt rise to the surface." 290
While it would seem hard to improve upon the extensive
and carefully planned communication and notification tech-
niques employed by the United States during the Cuban
quarantine, it would now appear that the United States
has , because of its advance lead time and the known serious-
ness of its present mining measures
,
provided for even more
in depth notification procedures during its North Vietnamese

















This is because not only were the affected Communist
vessels located in North Vietnamese ports given a three day
"grace period" before the mines were activated , but because
detailed notification of the planned U.S. mining measures
was also communicated to the nations concerned before the
291President had even concluded his May 8th presentation.
It was even believed by some sources that the Soviets and
possibly the Chinese were provided with some broad based
indication of the measures which the U.S. might have planned
since modern diplomatic contacts are "virtually continuous' 1
and the United States / in private talks with the Kremlin, might
have "conditioned" the Soviet's reaction to a possible mining
interdiction. 292
Once the North Vietnamese mining interdiction was
commenced. United States vessels were instructed to "use
their best efforts to insure that all vessels transiting the
hioh seas in this area are notified by appropriate signals
of the . . . measures being undertaken in the internal and
claimed territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam." 293
These efforts, as previously noted, included having
personnel aboard U.S. vessels stationed on the n notification
line" who could "warn away" any merchant ship from these
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to existing international signal codes.
The high degree of complexity and preparation
associated with manning and operating such a "notification
line" would be substantial when one realizes that the cap-
ability to be able to provide notification in all
ten foreign languages was probably within the assigned
mission of several of these U.S. notification vessels.
In fact, it would be difficult to imagine any other
situation where a country engaged in naval interdiction
operations against an enemy then under heavy air and
naval attack by forces of the same land had intentionally
diverted its own warships in order to aive timely warning
to vessels of third party countries destined for the mined
ports of the enemy and carrying munitions and supplies to
that foe. Nevertheless, the United States, in order to
minimize excessive domestic criticism, while beincy ever
mindful of North Vietnam's strategic power alicrnment3,
chose this method as the most prudent and restrained
course of action possible by imposing such onerous
notification reguirements upon elements of its own forces.
Never in the history of naval warfare has a nation gone to
such lengths to give detailed notification of dangerous
conditions to those "non-belligerent" third party countries














3 . Avoidance of Unnecessary Confrontation
Perhaps the most significant feature of the current
mining campaion is the selective employment of passive naval
weapons to interdict the delivery of all seaborne supplies.
Throuqh the employment of carefully laid mine fields, the
United States has placed North Vietnam's maritime suppliers
in a position which requires them to make one of three
choices: The first, to attempt to "run the blockade" and
risk possible damage or destruction to their ships as well
as to risk injury or death to their crews; the second, to
seek alternate unmined ports of entry for transshipment of
cargoes by overland routes and the third, to undertake
to make no shipments to North Vietnam whatsoever. Of the
three principal courses open to the countries which have
been making seaborne deliveries to North Vietnam, the first
and the third choices are clearly the most unpalatable,
leavina the second choice as the most logical course of
action to be undertaken. Recardless of which course of
action was undertaken by North Vietnam's major seaborne
suppliers, the initial choice in every case was for each
cargo carrying nation involved to make, rather than the
first post-mining move being left up to the United States.
This aeneral built-in delaying feature of "blockade"
or "maritime interdiction" which because of its relative
-134-
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slowness to operate qives each side time to think, and
therefore reduces the risks associated with such an oper-
ation, is of critical importance to the decision makers
involved in reducing the likelihood that a hasty decision
might be forthcomino.
In some cases , the blockading or interdicting nation
must also make a decision such as boarding or blocking
passage of a vessel. However, it is the blockade-rtmning
nation which must firs t make the key decision to bring
about such a confrontation once the blockader's prestige
295
is placed on the line. Thus, Mr. L.w. Martin, in
his book entitled The Sea in Modern Strategy , has deliniated
one of the most valuable features of blockades in oeneral
and delayed action mining interdiction in particular when
he states that: "Blockade thus has one of the most desirable
characteristics in a technique of crisis management, that of
296transferrins the onus of escalation to the other side."
Indeed, with the computers in the newly sown mines
automatically activating their arming devices after the
passace of three "day liqht periods," all that was required
of the United States if it wanted to forego the possibility
of the offloading of supplies by North Vietnamese liohters,
was to sit back and see of any foreiqn vessels would attempt







Of course, under the circumstances of the current
mining interdiction, every effort was made to minimize
any possible superpower confrontation. For this reason,
the U.S. mines were exclusively sown in North Vietnam's
territorial and inland waters in an effort to preclude
any possible surface craft confrontation or possible mine
damage or losses to foreign vessels engaged in navigation
on the hioh seas.
It should also be remembered, however, that during the
period that the Cuban quarantine was effective (October 24th
to November 2nd 1962) fifty-five merchant ships were
scrutinized by the United States before they were allowed
297to proceed. Among them, was the Soviet tanker Bucharest
which was intercepted on October 25, 1962 and visually
inspected while the Lebanese ship Marcula was actually
stopped, boarded and searched by units of the United States
298Navy's quarantine force on the following day.
The United States , not wantina to even hint at the
possibility of such a high seas interception of Communist
bloc commerce, took great pains to emphasize that North
Vietnam was the sole intended target and, in the words of
President Nixon's May 8th address, "these actions are not
directed against any other nation." 2"
It was also for the same reason of attempting to arrive




inoffensive as possible to third party shippers, that the
current mining interdiction measures were devised. However,
unlike the Cuban crisis wherein President Kennedy proclaimed
a quarantine which included interception, boarding and search
orders, in the case of the U.S. mining interdiction in North
Vietnamese waters, all descriptive nomenclature such as
"blockade" , "pacific blockade" or "naval quarantine" was
scrupulously avoided.
In noting that some maritime restrictive measures
such as 'pacific blockade' have acquired a specific and
ascertainable meaning, Mr. L.W. Martin makes the following
analytical observation:
Some measures such as 'pacific blockade, * have at
times acquired a technical meaning and are recog-
nized to involve certain rules. But the legiti-
macy of acts of force, at least in the eyes of
the lawyers , lies not so much in their intrinsic
nature as in the overall circumstances of the
case, although certain proportionality [consid-
erations] must be observed. In other words, it
is the circumstances of [the] action rather
than the precise means employed that determine
the legal claim of a state to depict its action
as lawful. 300
Finally, Professor John Norton Moore, in analyzing the
reasons why President Nixon did not use the term "blockade"
in describing his North Vietnamese raining measures has















If, then, the conditions were present for a lawful
blockade why was it carefully announced only as an
•interdiction of weapons and supplies?' It was not
because the President lacks constitutional authority
to institute a blockade. The U.S. action, whether
termed 'blockade' or 'interdiction, ' was the kind
of tactical decision about the conduct of ongoina
hostilities which fall within the President's
power of Commander-in-Chief . Rather, the decision
to avoid the term 'blockade' was part of a series of
careful limitations intended to minimize the risk of
confrontation with non-belligerents. By speaking
only of 'interdiction,' President Nixon avoided
inadvertently signalling a wider objective, such as
the economic or political subjugation of North
Vietnam, which might have been imolied by use of
the term 'blockade.' 30 *
It would therefore seem apparent that through the
prudent and limited utilization of automatic mines and
naval surface craft, the United States has established
a highly effective maritime interdiction campaign while
simultaneously avoiding any unnecessary confrontation
between superpowers and while minimizing the possibility
of the unnecessary destruction of a wide range of human
values.
4 . Modification Of Tactics So As To
Moderate The Scope Of Claims
In discussing the difficulties in attempting to impose
fixed and unyielding legal doctrine to areas of rapidly










areas of naval blockade and quarantine interdiction, Prof-
fessor Myres McDouaal has observed that:
It was also in response to these changed [blockading]
conditions of military technology and combat oper-
ations that instrumentalities other than surface
cruisers were resorted to for physically controlling
the flow of commerce to the enemy. The principal
instrumentalities employed for this purpose in the
last two VJorld Wars were the mine, the submarine
and the aircraft. Frequently all three weapons were
utilized to supplement one another. . . . 3"2
In responding to the proposition advanced by Professor
Robert W. Tucker that "[t]he effectiveness required of valid
blockades cannot be secured by means violative of other firmly
established rules [while] the element of danger associated
with an effective blockade is . . . understood in terms of a
liability to seizure and eventual condemnation, though not
in terms of a liability to destruction [as in the case of
mines and submarines] upon entrance into a forbidden area,"
Professor McDougal has observed that this requirement for
all blockading instrumentalities to conform to the blockading
standards originally projected for surface squadrons is in
effect a comprehensive ban against technological improvements
being effectively used in the maritime blockades of the future,
Professor McDougal then continues his rebuttal of Prof-






for it should be evident even upon casual observat-
ion that, of itself, a minefield can never, and
submarines and aircraft only in very exceptional
cases, meet the requirements of a cordon of vessels.
The position taken by Professor Tucker would appear
to represent an inadequate Generalization of past
experience and perspectives , and , so far as concerns
estimations of probable future practice and decision
in comparable contexts, [appears] substantially to
have escaped contact with reality. 3°3
To illustrate, with particular reference to the
establishment of war zones where stretches of ocean
are sown with mines, the important general consider-
ation would seem to be that mines, as an instrument-
ality of blockade, need not be more destructive of
neutral values than surface vessels. More specifi-
cally, the strategic importance, in the particular
war in question, of the object of stemming the
stream of commerce with the enemy; the details of
the particular use of mined war zones, including
the specific disposition of mines? the economics
made possible in time, effort, and commitment of
surface craft; the giving or witholding and timing
of notification of neutrals - - all appear factors
appropriately included in the assaying of reason-
ableness. Thus, as the Allied Powers used them in
the last World Wars, 304 minefields functioned
strategically as blockade devices bv channeling
shipping in particular parts of the ocean to pre-
determined routes for subjection to contraband and
export control procedures. Both effectiveness and
minimum destruction [of values] were served by
giving notice to neutrals of the extent and location
of minefields . . . and of safe passage through
them .... The neutral vessel which ignored the
notice and which would presumably do so only if
engaged in commerce with the enemy of course became
liable to destruction in the minefield. It is ...
only by the examination of the above and other types
of detailed factors in the use of minefields as in
the use of submarines and aircraft, that rational
discriminations can be made as [to] the lawfulness
(reasonableness) of particular, newer instrumentalit-
ies for securing the requirement of effectiveness in





In order that the reasonableness of the current U.S.
mining interdiction can be evaluated in terras of military
effectiveness and minimum destruction of human values, the
five factors outlined by Professor McDougal are thought
to constitute meaningful and appropriate guidelines from
which to evaluate each competincr claim.
Factor (1) The .Strategic Importance in the
Particular War in Question
The strategic significance and the importance of the
U.S. mining interdiction in North Vietnam was stressed by
President Nixon during his May 8th address when he stated
that:
I have therefore concluded that Hanoi must be
denied the weapons and supplies it needs to
continue the aggression [since) fa] major
portion of the supplies through which the
invasion of South Vietnam is being supported
[is coming] from the sea. It is essential
that this delivery of supplies from the sea
be prevented so that North Vietnam cannot
continue to resupply both its forces in the
field and its logistics base [at home] . 306
Clearly, the strategic importance of the mining
interdiction measures which the President commenced on
May 8, 1972 were of paramount concern to him as President
and to the people of the nation as a whole in endeavoring
not onlv to eliminate all future war supplies from being
141-
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delivered to the enemy but also to bring about the speedy
and humane end of the conflict itself.
Factor (2) The Object of Stopping the Stream
of Commerce with the F.nemv
I I .
Ull I J -
As previously noted above, the object of stopping
the "stream of commerce'1 with which the enemy was being
supplied was of paramount importance to the United States.
The ver^' first paragraph of the President's May 8th
address referred to the massive Communist invasion landed
five weeks earlier which was made possible by "tanks,
artillery, and other advanced weapons supplied to Hanoi
by other Communist nations. *"' In addition, the very
life blood of the North Vietnamese Communist's mechanized
offensive was dependent on 35 to 40 thousand metric tons
of petroleum being pumped into its storage areas from
those Soviet tankers at Haiphong which had , for years
,
been providing over 80 per cent of North Vietnam's oil
supplies.
Factor (3) Details of the Particular Use
of the Mined "War Zones "
Unlike the extensive mine "barracres" employed during
-142-
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World War I and the unlimited naval mine blockades of
World War II , the evolutionary trends pertaining to the
modern naval interdiction techniques first inaugurated
durincr the Cuban quarantine and subseauently refined in
the current U.S. mining interdiction of 1972, show a
marked reduction in the size anc? scope of blockading
claims. This reduction in the size and scope of modern
interdiction claims is clearly the result of the more
moderating influences brought about by the extremely
conservative "limited war" and "measures short of war"
interdiction techniques which stem from the desire on
the part of modern decision makers to minimize excessive
or unreasonable areas of confrontation and to avoid the
excessive and unwarranted destruction of human resources
and associated values.
In order to achieve these more moderate methods of
maritime interdiction, the United States has relied upon
supply interdiction and embargo techniques which are
practices somewhat related to the restrictive measures
associated with the traditional concepts of "pacific
blockade." However, the emergence of the newer maritime
restrictive measures , starting with the development of
the quarantine-interdiction, ignored the limiting char-
acteristics of pacific blockade which, if followed slavish-






















third party states. Professor Gerhard von Glahn, in his
book Lav Anoncr Nations has expressed the belief that the
evolutionary changes in the laws of naval blockade were
accelerated by the Cuban crisis since the utilization of
a "quarantine*1 did not meet the "traditional'' standards
of international law. In arrivincr at this conclusion,
Professor von Glahn observes that:
The term 'quarantine, * [which] was initially used
to describe the action adopted fby the United
States] indicated the realization that this
was a new method of blockade. Analysis reveals
that it falls somewhere between the two tradit-
ional types of blockade; it was a pacific block-
ade in that neither the element of intent for
war nor a "state of war" did exist? at the same
time, it was a hostile blockade in that the
quarantine was to be applied aqainst vessels of
a third state. 309
In the most recent evolutionary refinement of the
concept of "blockade," the United States, in planning and
executing its current North Vietnamese mining interdiction
campaign, relied on an assimilation of the practices est-
ablished in Cuba while further limiting the scope of its
claims by substituting as the dominant enforcement device





Factor (4) Economics Made Possible in Terras of
Time, Effort and the Commitment of
Surface Craft
The evolutionary trends associated with a possible
economic saving and the more efficient utilization of
available surface craft have not been overriding factors
in the planning and execution of recent maritime restrict-
ive measures. If anything, the United States has conspic-
uous lv 'over deployed" its forces in an attempt to con-
vince apparent "target" nations of the extent of its
resolve and commitment. However, in the case of a combined
mine-surface craft interdiction measure such as is current-
ly in progress in North Vietnam, there can be no doubt that
the employment of significant numbers of sophisticated mines
in conjunction with modern surface vessels is consistent
with the traditional concepts of "economy of force" in terms
of the savings of time, effort and the availability of a
reserve of naval forces.
Factor (5) The Giving or V?itholding of
Notification to Neutrals
As previously stated, one of the most significant













interdiction campaign now beincr conducted is the extensive
utilization of elaborate notification measures designed
to minimize inadvertent damage or destruction to third
party "neutral" shipping values. The extent of the U.S.
communication effort both in terms of the notification
given as well as its timing, are two of the key indicia
pertaining to the increase in the number of moderating
measures being adopted as between the "blockading powers
vs the "neutral shipping nations" and the extent of the
U.S. effort in attemptincr to convince these third party
nations of the reasonableness of U.S. interdiction claims.
In applyina these five factors which Professor
McDoucal has provided for the purposes of assaying the
reasonableness of a given interdiction campaign, it is
believed that even the most ardent critic of U.S.
defense policies would be in accord with the proposition
that the evolutionary trends associated with modern
methods of naval interdiction have resulted in a substan-
tial modification of tactics and a sicmificant reduction
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c • Value Conserving Considerations Shown During
the 1972 U.S. Mining Interdiction Campaign
* • The Employment of Comprehensive
Warninq Measures
As previously mentioned in earlier portions of this
thesis, the United States nay have employed one of the
most elaborate warning techniques during the course of
its North Vietnamese mining interdiction as has any nation
during the recorded history of maritime blockade. These
stringent, self-imposed notification requirements are all
the more significant since the so-called "neutral' third
party trading nations which were provided such detailed
warnings, were in reality, the principal suppliers of
North Vietnam's armed forces. Were it not for the compre-
hensive and timely notification measures employed by the
United States, however, the enormous risks involved in
such a mining "blockade" would clearly have been multi-
plied a hundred-fold.
The true measure of the effectiveness of the value
conserving considerations embodied in the United States
notification techniques is that as of this writing, there




destruction to any foreicm merchant vessel while the only
known casualty which occurred to date was been the under-
water damaoe sustained bv a vessel assigned to the United
States interdiction forces.
By providing detailed notification of the type of
mininc measures which it intended to employ and by simul-
taneously couplina this notification to a three day "arace
period" in which foreicm vessels could enter or depart
North Vietnam's mined ports, the United States not only
minimized the possible damage or destruction to third
party shippina but it also minimized the likelihood of
any retaliatory action heinq taken against the United
States by the other superpowers involved.
2. The Exemption of Small Vessels From
Maritime Restrictive Measures
Until the advent of the United States decision in
Korea to fcreco the traditional immunity usually accorded
small coastal flshinc vessels encaged in peacefule fishing
operations. United States forces, ever since the turn of
the century, had observed the letter and spirit of a
1900 U.S. Supreme Court decision declaring that under the









not liable to capture and condemnation in prize. 31 *
In the landmark decision of The Paguette Kabana , the
United States Supreme Court reiterated the established
rule of customary law that small coastal fishing vessels
could engage in local fishina activities without being
subject to capture and without destroying the effective-
ness of the blockade. In reaching his decision, Mr.
Justice Gray reasoned that the prevailing humanitarian
views of mutual accommodation and the tenderness tradition-
ally shown to a "poor and industrious order of people"
,
required the United States to forego the capture and
condemnation in prize of these small coastal fishing
vessels. However, Justice Gray went on to qualify this
exemption by setting forth the following limitations:
The exemption, of course, does not apply to
[coastal] fishermen or their vessels, if
employed for a warlike purpose, or in such
a way as to give aid or information to the
enemy; nor when military or naval operations
create a necessity to which all private
interests must give way. 312
During the Korean conflict, the United States
blockading forces made no exception for the usually
exempt fishing craft and all such vessels which had been
















purpose of these U.S. actions was to cut off the main
source of food supply for North Korean and Chinese
Communist troops since fish was a staple in their diet.
In addition, incidents of North Korean "deep sea" fishing
vessels serving as military communications and weather
craft had frequently occurred throughout the course of
the war.
However, during this country's most recent mining
interdiction campaicm in North Vietnam in 1972, the
United States saw fit to again afford coastal fishing
vessels their traditional immunity through the exclusive
employment of raacmetic type mines, the utilization of
which was designed to permit wooden-hulled vessels, such
as fishing boats, to exercise their riaht of unhindered
passage. It should be noted that during a Defense
Department briefing which released information that U.S.
mines could only be triggered by the passage of H a size-
able metalic object, M U.S. spokesmen also inferred that
acoustic and pressure type mines were readily available
and would be employed in the future if North Vietnam should
nullify the immunity accorded its wooden fishing vessels
by trying to temporarily convert them into minesweepers
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3 . The Attempt to Minimize Loss
of Life and Human Suffering
While the critics of the current United States
mining interdiction campaign have pointed out that the
U.S. attempts to throttle the delivery of war materials
contained in the seaborne cargoes destined for the ports
of North Vietnam would also deny 'food, petroleur. and
the necessities of life" to that country's civilian
population, **° and may not be so different from the
indiscriminate attacks against non-belligerent shipping
which were carried out by world War I German U-boat
Commanders in 1917, * these same critics despite their
self-professed interest in U.S. naval interdiction
policies, have failed to suggest any other reasonably
effective and available alternative to the U.S. naval
interdiction measures which are now being enforced off
the coast of North Vietnam. For when one discusses
those value conserving considerations shown during the
planning and implementation stages of the present U.S.
mining policy, or the lack thereof, one should also bear
in mind the nature of the "other" available military
instrumentalities of war x*hich mioht be employed as
as alternative coercive measures the use of which,
-151-

however, might tend to cause extremely hiah losses of
life and produce excessive amounts of human pain and
sufferina.
For instance, if U.S. decision makers had not decided
to utilize a mine warfare interdiction campaign, then an
alternative mode of coercion such as extremely heavy
bombinc? raids , might have been exclusively employed to
destroy Haiphong's docks and other port facilities.
It would seem to follow, therefore, that the less
reliance the United States placed upon traditional
as well as innovative maritime restrictive measures,
the greater reliance the United States would have had
to place on massive bombing raids.
While the results of the U.S. air war against North
Vietnam were already staggering in terms of the costs
in human lives and in losses of property, any additional
U.S. commitment in order to produce the equivalent effects
of a successful mining interdiction, would have required
the United States to drastically increase its use of the
following offensive air interdiction measures:
Industrial Bombing
The U.S. air war campeion which is presently termed
317
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increasingly concentrated on the systematic destruction
of all industrial and manufacturing plants, electric power
and transformer sites, petroleum storacre facilities and
numerous other civilian installations vital to the North
Vietnamese war effort and economy. 318 jn addition to the
destruction of the industrial targets previously mentioned
,
U.S. offensive air activities have also included the tar-
geting and destruction of numerous major highway and canal
bridges as well as other rail and surface communication
319links. Because of the small amount of steel and
building materials which are produced within North Vietnam
itself, the immediate repair and replacement of such bombed
out facilities would have been extremely limited. However,
on June 25, 1972, United States jets were reported to have
dropped laser-cruided 2000 pound "smart bombs" into the
Thai Nguyen Steel Plant's open hearth furnace thereby
destroying North Vietnam's entire steel-producing capacity.
The complex, two sguare miles in area, is the biggest
industrial plant in North Vietnam and the only domestic





Shortly after the U.S. mining interdiction canpaicm
was announced, the North Vietnamese Government began to
lodge protests against those American air strikes which
were said to have damaged or endangered North Vietnam's
important network of flood-control dikes. After vehemently
denying that the United States had ever "targeted" North
Vietnamese dikes as such, a crescendo of criticism engulfed
U.S. policy makers during the third and fourth weeks of
Julv, 1972 concerning U.S. air attacks which were said
to have damaged these flood control structures. VJhile
travel inor in Moscow, United Nations Secretary-General,
Kurt VTaldheim said, on July 22nd, that he was concerned
about U.S. bombincs of North Vietnam's dikes and that
thousands would die if such bombings were carried out.
Secretary-General Waldheim's appeal to the United States
expressing hope that "this [result] will be avoided,"
produced a hicrh decree of confusion, consternation and
belated clarification concerning just what the United
States air policy was with regard to the bombing of North
Vietnam's dike network. As an outcome of these heated













released a Government intelligence report on July 28, 1972
which indicated that American bombing had damaged North
Vietnam's dike system at twelve points but that the bombing
was said to be unintentional and that the damage which
322had been inflicted was said to be only slight.
Civilian Casualties
Following the renewed commencement of full scale
bombing which was resumed on April 6, 1972, charges from
Hanoi that "areat numbers" of civilians were killed or
wounded in U.S. bombing raids on shipyards, warehouses
and army depots were followed by official U.S. acknowledg-
ments that M If civilians were working in army depots and
in the areas that were hit, there probably were casualties
323because the bombs went in right on target."
The apparent results of similar bombing attacks
provoked Sweden's Ambassador to Hanoi to accuse the
United States of pursuing "a policy of annihilation" in
its bombing of North Vietnam. ^24 In an interview
published in the Stockholm newspaper Aftonbladet , Ambassa-
dor Jean-Chris tophe Oeberg said that "American bombing
was designed to weaken North Vietnam's economy for a





in Southeast Asia. The Ambassador also alleged that the
United States was not only bombing military targets but
it was also "dropping antipersonnel bombs on housing areas,
325
schools and hospitals. ..."
Anti Personnel Bombs
Reports givincr the North Vietnamese versions of U.S.
air attacks which were published in The New York Times
assert that American planes, on June 28, 1972, destroyed
two dispensaries in the Port of Kaiphoncr while "dart bombs"
were released by U.S. aircraft which "killed and wounded
32g
many people in the city. H
Dart Bombs
In an article published in The Washington Post on
July 13, 1972 announcing that American warplanes had
been dropping a whole range of bombs including a special
variety which dispensed tear and nausea gases, U.S.
intelligence sources at the same briefing, provided the
following backnround information concerning the following
















(1) The CBU-24 and CBU-33 bombs packed with dozens
of small bomb lets designed to blow the tires off
trucks and the treads of*5 tanks which pass over
them?
(2) The gravel anti-personnel cluster bomb unit
which according to a military manual has
the appearance of gravel but "can blow a man's
foot off but will not blow a hole in a truck
tire" j and
(3) The Mk-36 incendiary cluster bomb, an 800 pound
weapon packed with 182 fire borablets of V7orld
War II design. 327
It does not take a significant amount of imagination
to envision the awesome effects which these antipersonnel
weapons might produce if inadvertently released over North
Vietnamese population centers. And, even if repeated U.S.
assurances that North Vietnamese population centers are
not being targeted" or subjected to direct air attacks
utilizing these and other similarly destructive weapons
are taken at face value, a strong possibility would seem
to exist that out of the 400 to 500 air strikes conducted
weekly, some inadvertent or premature releases of explosive
weapons including U.S. "specialty bomb" cannisters could
conceivably occur, particularly if the U.S. aircraft
involved was attempting to avoid anti-aircraft fire,
surface to air missiles, North Vietnamese interceptors
or to engage in other highly evasive maneuvers.
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which can he produced by the inadvertent bonbing of
population centers, the alternative value conservinq
considerations associated with maritime minincr interdiction
become qraphically clear. As Lieutenant Commander Arnold
S. Lott, the author of "Japan's Nightmare - - Mine Blockade"
has written:
A mine blockade enables the winner to win without
killing. Enemy ships lost in a mine field enter
it by their own choice? the enemy is free to keep
his ships in port and save them if he wishes.
But more important, mines never destroy homes,
hospitals or industrial facilities necessary to
peacetime rehabilitation, nor do they wipe out







While it would appear that at the time the Pres-
ident made his May Bth mining interdiction announcement
and during the subsequent amplifying news conferences held
by hiah Administration officials, the need for the United
States to conduct offensive mining measures was amply
demonstrated - - it is recommended that future broader-
based and more fully coordinated follow-up efforts be
undertaken by utilizing news media and public information
channels to more actively portray the effects of the
U.S. mining interdiction in terms of minimizina the
destruction of human values and as a positive protection
against the unnecessary destruction of human life.
It is conceded, however, that such an announced presen-
tation of the positive virtues of the current Bluing
interdiction policv mi<?ht unnecessarily alter the
apparently successful "low profile" posture of the
current mininc interdiction by either re-introducing it
as a controversial public issue or causing it to be
contrasted with other unpopular military
measures (such as the heavy bombing of North Vietnam's
indvistrial centers or the alleged bombinq attacks along
North Vietnam's avstem of dikes) thereby causing such








decision makers as being counter productive. However, because
of the sensitivity of such a course of action, it is recom-
mended, that, to the greatest extent possible, the major
portion of any announcement concerning the humane and value
conserving considerations relating to the commencement of a
naval mining interdiction be made contemporaneously with the
inauguration of such maritime restrictive measures or made as
soon thereafter as is practicable.
Likewise, in order to demonstrate the concern of the
United States for such humanitarian considerations as
would safely permit the carefully monitored introduction
of medical supplies through mined North Vietnamese ports
and harbors, it is recommended that special provisions
be made by United States decision makers to permit the
passage of needed medical stores through the mined
"interdiction zone" on a prudent and selective basis.
One major difficulty in such a course of action lies, of
course, in the inability of the United States to insure
that such medical supplies will not ultimately be forward-
ed to the armed forces of our foes . However , to the
greatest extent possible, the inauguration of such
humanitarian measures should be actively explored and
and the decision to engage in such a value conserving
undertaking should, if warranted, be made the subject
of a public disclosure.
-160-
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guarding of classified mine warfare technolocrv, consider-
ation be given to the public release of information
concerning proposed or contemplated methods of mine
deactivation and removal after the current U.S. mining
interdiction has served its intended purpose. Such a
public disclosure given to international shipping
interests would tend to make the choice of U.S. decision
makers to employ current mining interdiction measures
even more palatable to third party nations and would
also serve to dramatize the fact that the United States
has the capability of safely removing the offensive mines
which it has sown once a satisfactory solution to bring
the present hostilities to an end has been achieved.
Finally, recognizing the extreme political and military
sensitivities in arrivimr at the initial decision to mine
a belliaerent's inland or territorial waters, once the risks
associated with the commencement of such measures during
future hostilities have been deemed to be acceptable, it is
highly recommended that the militarily effective and value
conservina instrumentality of a maritime interdiction be
implemented as soon as possible after the advent of hostil-
ities in order to maximize the flexibility and the impact
which this viable and highly selective naval sanctioning
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